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PREFACE
The study of nuclear war, and particularly how it might be fought,
is a formidable task given that such a war has never been waged. To
understand the nature of nuclear war, therefore, it is necessary to
use hypothetical, untested, and essentially probabilistic models about
the nuclear environment. The study of nuclear war is further compli-
cated by the intense ideological nature of the field. Nevertheless,
it was necessary to suggest the radical proposition that nuclear war
can be rational and that it should always be conducted as a political
operation. It is important to note that nuclear war, however catas-
trophic it may seem, can occur. If nuclear war is imminent, then the
ability to prevail will depend on adequate preparations. Indeed, nu-
clear war requires the same level of attention and planning as conven-
tional war.
I am fully aware of the enormous human, moral and economic conse-
quences of a nuclear war at any level of intensity. The death, pain
and loss that will be involved are almost unimaginable. Accordingly,
this detached analysis of how to fight such a war may appear insensi-
tive. This is far from the case. Indeed, in order, one hopes, to
forfend such a conflict the probable shapes of nuclear war need as
clearly as possible to be stated -- to the extent that the future re-
veals itself at all. Here we examine a nuclear war-fighting strategy
on its own merits. But in no way does this nullify the moral
V
consequences of such an eventuality.
In following this analysis, I would like to express my apprecia-
tion to Professors Edward Feit, Guenter Lewy, and Stephen Pelz for
their guidance during the writing of this dissertation. I wish to
thank my parents for their encouragement, especially my father. Dr.
Cyprien L. Martel for his keen political insights, and Dr. Paul L.
Savage for his military expertise and invaluable advice. The help
was theirs, the shortcomings are mine.
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ABSTRACT
A Nuclear War-Fighting Strategy for the United States
September 1981
William C. Martel
,
B.A., Saint Anselm College
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Edward Feit
This dissertation concerns a nuclear war-fighting strategy, that
is a strategy for fighting and winning a nuclear war. Despite the
"conventional wisdom" that nuclear war is suicidal and occurs only as
a result of irrationality, this study analyzes nuclear war as a ration-
al policy option. It is necessary to suggest the radical proposition
that nuclear war, like traditional military campaigns, is a political
action. Thus, nuclear war can be in the national interest. Further,
the countervalue strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction is question-
ed because city destruction serves no conceivable political or mili-
tary objective.
The dissertation follows the stages of analysis as outlined
below:
1. The war-fighting strategy is defined as a political act seek-
ing the total political and military defeat of the Soviet Union. Reci-
procal destruction, "spasm" war, automatic retaliation, and counter-
value destruction are avoided. Therefore, a nuclear attack would
target Soviet counterforce, but not countervalue, centers. It is the
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threat of counterforce destruction that deters war. However paradoxi-
cal it seems, deterrence is related to a war-winning capability. Thus,
U.S. nuclear capabilities are assessed.
2. Soviet nuclear strategy apparently emphasizes offensive nu-
clear operations: strike first in order to overwhelm the United States.
An assessment of Soviet nuclear capabilities reinforces the view that
it intends to win.
3. Analysis of nuclear war indicates that victory depends on coun-
terforce destruction. If war involves first-strike attacks against
ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers, then the probable direction and
outcome of war can be charted.
4. In order to survive nuclear war it is necessary to keep the
war limited. In this context, civil defense is rational and effective
for protecting the populations needed for recovery. Civil defense
could mean the difference between recovery and defeat.
5. While the offense was the dominant strategy, it is now appar-
ent that with lasers a successful defense is feasible. In an analysis
of lasers and advanced ICBMs, the dimensions of future war are esta-
blished.
6. Concluding, a series of propositions about nuclear strategy
are followed by recommendations for future U.S. nuclear deployments.
A methodology for calculating ICBM vulnerability is defined in the
appendix.
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IINTRODUCTION
Since 1945 American conceptions of peace have been founded on the
somewhat fragile notion that the United States could destroy any aggres-
sor launching a nuclear attack against it or any of its allies. As the
primary nuclear doctrine. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) rests de-
terrence on the American ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on any
attacker. "Assured destruction" of the attacker made an attack on the
United States fruitless because the attacker's cities and industries
would be destroyed in a nuclear holocaust. This is known as the "coun- ^
tervalue" strategy of MAD.
For reasons to be examined later, our concern is a nuclear strategy
based on a counterforce, rather than on a countervalue, attack; that is,
an attack against military targets, such as inter-continental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), strate-
gic bombers, and command and control centers. While a counterforce at-
tack is not alone sufficient as a nuclear strategy, it is the essential
component of a nuclear war-fighting strategy for the objective is to
defeat rather than to simply destroy the enemy.
To understand the significance of this war-fighting strategy, it is
first necessary to compare briefly MAD and counterforce. In addition we
will examine the most frequently cited arguments in support of and in
opposition to these strategies. Lastly we will assess the importance
of counterforce in a war-fighting nuclear strategy.
1
2Mutually Assured Destruction
Proponents of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) posit that attack
on the United States will be deterred by the threat of "countervalue"
destruction; that is, attacks against enemy industries, cities, and
towns. Deterrence is measured by the number of civilians killed and in-
dustrial capacity destroyed. Such destruction, the argument runs, would
deter a rational opponent. The dimensions of this destruction are evi-
dent from the following calculations. In 1968 the United States planned
to kill or injure 20 to 25 per cent of the Soviet civilian population
and 50 per cent of the Soviet industrial capacity.^ Therefore, the
United States, in an optimum nuclear attack, sought to kill about 50
million Soviet citizens and destroy about half the Soviet gross national
product.
It is important to note that I^D is essentially a countervalue
strategy that aims to destroy people and industry, but it does not en-
vision counterforce attacks. The reason for this is that the nascent
U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals could not attack military targets be-
cause they were not accurate enough; until the late 1960s, most warheads
would land within a mile or so of the target. This is not detrimental
if the target is a large, sprawling city that would be destroyed by even
a near miss. A missile silo, however, to be destroyed must be hit direct-
ly. MAD, therefore, sees potential mass civilian destruction as inevi-
table and desirable because a nation will not attack if it knows that
its own people will be destroyed. Thus, the basis for all MAD nuclear
strategy was the planned destruction of people and the industries that
3support them.
One of the more interesting points about the MAD strategy was that
a minimum deployment of nuclear weapons was alone useful in deterring
war. Nuclear weapons are seen as so destructive that no gains could
outweigh the tremendous losses of a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons, then,
are for deterrence only and not for actual use. The only exception is
in the case of an irrational or insane opponent. Such an opponent could
not be deterred : as it is impractical to plan for insanity, and as
most opponents are sane, nuclear deterrence was a sound strategy. Nu-
clear weapons, it is argued, are too destructive for use other than to
ensure national survival; a Soviet attack on the United States would be
catastrophic. The United States would be compelled to respond with its
own nuclear weapons destroying the Soviet Union in turn. The avoidance
of such an exchange by all sides is central to MAD. Even limited use of
nuclear weapons would threaten the very existence of modern civilization.
No nation could cope with the physical and psychological dislocation
following a nuclear strike. That such an exchange could come only by
insanity or accident seems logical given this approach.
A revolutionary feature of MAD, early in its development, was its
elimination of the need for a nuclear arms race. Since any nuclear ex-
change was catastrophic, a sensible deterrent force say, of 100 nuclear
weapons was all that deterrence required. What sane national leader
wanted 100 nuclear weapons directed at his cities and factories? MAD
would deter aggression as long as one adversary could destroy a given
percentage of the opposing society. MAD was and remains inviolable be-
cause of its many sided appeal to politicians and defense bureaucrats.
4It seemingly offers peace at an affordable price. And the price need
never be paid. Even the most "successful" initial attack must, if the
theory holds, lead to the attacker's certain end.
The most essential feature of MAD as a nuclear strategy is that it
increases the probability of peace. The rationale is that nuclear war
is horrible, and that the more horrible it is the less likely is it to
occur. It is an anathema to proponents of MAD for nuclear war to be
viewed as controllable. Were this so, then by their reasoning, nuclear
war would be more likely.
Proponents of MAD further argue that it is the most moral choice.
Although the destruction of innocent people does appear to be immoral,
this threat of destruction is acceptable if nuclear war is averted by
this means. For the supporters of this logic, the destruction caused
by a nuclear war will make all other human atrocities pale by comparison.
Is not the destruction of civilization the most immoral conceivable act?
The proponents of MAD would, doubtless, admit that there is immorality
in a strategy that posits killing civilians in order to prevent a nuclear
war, but here, they say, the "end does justify the means." (Parentheti-
cally, the proponents of MAD would be wise to point out that morality,
in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, is not the first concern of the inter-
national statesman; the highest concern is preservation of the state,
and this is his only moral obligation."^ As nuclear war would violate
that obligation, plans to avoid nuclear war are neither moral nor immoral,
but must be viewed as amoral.)
In summary, MAD is presented as the only rational nuclear strategy.
Any other concept of nuclear war as fightable, winnable, or survivable
5is not only irrational but is likely to cause nuclear war. MAD accord-
ing to this view is a direct descendant of the principle that war should
only be fought for a definite political goal. If there is no political
advantage to nuclear war, MAD is the only choice.^
MAD is criticized for describing nuclear weapons as a perversion of
military technology. Its proponents, however, suggest that nuclear
weapons are not perverse, but can be used by any nation that devises a
rational strategy for fighting a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons, thus,
place a preniiuiii on coherent planning, and emphasize the use of nuclear
weapons in war only where there is a clear political purpose. ^ There-
fore, MAD cripples its executors but benefits an adversary who rejects
it.
Opponents of MAD seek to reverse the axiom that nuclear war is un-
thinkable, unwinnable, and unsurvivable. They believe that immediate
survival and eventual recovery are possible. If an adversary such as
the Soviet Union accepts nuclear war as thinkable, winnable, and sur-
vivable and plans accordingly, it is more likely to defeat an opponent,
such as the United States, who accepts MAD.
Furthermore, MAD is criticized because as a nuclear strategy it
ignores the intensely ideological nature of modern international rela-
tions. In a world dominated by two such ideological foes as the United
States and Soviet Union, the failure to deter war involves very high
costs.
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With respect to fighting a nuclear war MAD is "strategically and
politically wrong" because it does not give decision-makers any choice
but to attack cities.^ Thus, the only real option for MAD is mass mutual
f6
suicide. This assumes that a nation will launch a MAD strike knowing
that this means its destruction. Is it plausible, ask the opponents
of MAD, that a nation will launch this attack? For the opponents of
MAD, the answer is no.
MAD is also criticized because the only response in a nuclear war
is spasm response. War, however, is always more complex than simple
first and second strikes. The Soviet Union, for example, might acci-
dentally launch a nuclear strike; with MAD there is no plan for limited
counterattacks. In this case it is sensible to limit such a war.
The more immediate concern with MAD is the consequences of a coun-
tervalue nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
What would happen if one nation could inflict more countervalue destruc-
tion than the other? Recalling that the United States formulated MAD
in the 1950s when it had unquestioned nuclear superiority, equal coun-
tervalue destruction seemed remote. In 1981, given the larger yield of
Soviet nuclear warheads, a Soviet countervalue strike against the United
States would be more destructive than a U.S. countervalue strike. Con-
cerned with such Soviet superiority, the United States may strike first.
And thus, according to the opponents of MAD, deterrence would collapse.
The opponents of MAD are concerned that the Soviet Union may not
accept MAD, that the Soviet Union has a different view of deterrence,
and that it is not deterred by a U.S. MAD attack. Deterrence, it is
assumed, has the same meaning for the Soviet Union, and the United
States, and that both nations share similar views about the consequences
of nuclear war, the probability of nuclear war, and defeat. If MAD is
to function, however, the United States and Soviet Union must agree
7about these issues.
A further assumption is that they share similar views about the
definition of "unacceptable damage." As Richard Pipes observes:
A country that since 1914 has lost, as a result
of two world wars, a civil war, and various "purges"
perhaps up to 60 million civilians must define "un-
acceptable damage" differently from the United
States which has known no famines or purges, and
whose deaths from all the wars waged since 1775
are estimated at 650,000 — fewer casualties than
Russia suffered in the 900-day siege of Leningrad
in WW II alone.
8
A Counterforce Strategy
A counterforce strategy consists of direct attacks against the
9
opponents nuclear forces. This means an attack, for the United States,
against the entire range of Soviet nuclear forces: ICBMs in their
silos, SLBMs in port and at sea, strategic bombers at their fields and
in flight, and the command, control and communication (C ) network.
The rationale for counterforce is that an enemy cannot fight a nuclear
war if its forces are destroyed or crippled.
How does counterforce differ from MAD? For MAD the destruction of
counterforce targets is secondary to the destruction of civilian targets.
In counterforce, however, nuclear aggression is deterred not by the
threat of countervalue destruction alone but by the loss of nuclear
forces. For example, the United States is probably prepared to accept
23 million civilian casualties rather than lose its nuclear arsenal.
(It is plausible that this could be as high as 100 million casualties.)
Viewed out of context, this may seem quite callous, but in the context
8of deterrence it is very humane. Deterrence is secure because the
Soviet Union sees that the United States values its nuclear forces and
is willing to fight a nuclear war to protect them.
Counterforce provides nuclear stability if the counterforce capa-
bilities of the adversaries are equal. In this case there is no incen-
tive to fight a nuclear war because either attacker would face certain
counterforce retaliation. Not only is the price of failure to deter
war high, but there is a possibility of defeat. For example, if the
Soviet Union destroyed 90 per cent of U.S. ICBMs the United States
could launch devastating counterforce retailiation if it had equal CF
capabilities. In reality, however, with the small number of warheads
on U.S. ICBMs. even 100 surviving U.S. ICBMs, that is 10 per cent,
could not destroy enough Soviet counterforce targets to deter war.^^
Unlike MAD, with a counterforce strategy it is conceivable that a
nation could win a nuclear war. Once enemy nuclear forces are destroy-
ed, no further aggression is possible. Thus, with its nuclear forces
destroyed by the enemy or depleted from retaliation, a nation loses the
war because the opponent retains more nuclear forces. There is no need
to inflict countervalue damage because this would not affect the loss
caused by counterforce destruction.
A War-Fighting Strategy
In contrast to MAD, with a war-fighting strategy nuclear war is an
enterprise that can be fought and won for a well -defined political pur-
pose, but not for retaliation or revenge alone.
Proponents of war-fighting suggest that U.S. -Soviet relations are
9more stable if both nations are prepared to fight, and possibly win, a
nuclear war. The justification is that the probability of war is re-
duced if the outcome of war is uncertain. Nuclear war is also less like-
ly because the chance of victory is reduced, but only if all potential
combatants accept war-fighting. This strategy further reduces the pro-
bability of uncontrolled nuclear war and the destruction of cities and
industries. Nuclear war, thus, means less countervalue destruction with
war-fighting.
With a war-fighting strategy nuclear war will be won by the side
that destroys the adversary's military power and protects its civilian
population. This is radically divergent from MAD. Thus, with war-
fighting nuclear war is not necessarily suicidal but has the specific
objective of victory with manageable losses.
Counterforce is the primary instrument of war-fighting because the
defeat of the enemy (the aim of war-fighting) is not possible without
destroying its' nuclear forces (the aim of counterforce). Thus, a
strategy of war-fighting requires counterforce attacks because an enemy
is not defeated until his nuclear forces are eliminated.
Lastly, with this strategy of war-fighting the political dimension
of nuclear war is now critically important. With war-fighting it is
irrational to destroy countervalue targets because this does not weaken
the enemy's ability to fight.
Opponents of war-fighting suggest it is destabilizing because, if
the United States employed this strategy, the Soviet Union would be
pressured to launch its forces first. This is the "first-strike" attack.
Thus, war-fighting raises the specter of total nuclear war. It is
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therefore provocative and unnerving for any adversary J ^ opponents
further suggest that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
could achieve a war-fighting capability. Thus, war-fighting will start
another round in the arms race and make nuclear war more thinkable.
In order to clarify the theoretical and functional dimensions of a
war-fighting strategy the stages of analysis are followed as outlined
below.
1. This strategy is viewed here as an abstract model for v;ar. To
this degree the theoretical issues of deterrence, stability, the proba-
bility of nuclear war, victory and limited nuclear war are examined.
(Chapter I)
2. On the basis of the size and character of Soviet deployments,
Soviet nuclear strategy is compared with U.S. strategy. I propose to
examine the proposition that the Soviet Union has the capability to
fight and win a nuclear war. In this instance actual Soviet strategy
is, of course, uncertain. (Chapter II)
3. The functional issues of war-fighting are examined in the con-
text of actual nuclear operations. Using data about U.S. and Soviet
nuclear capabilities, the probable direction and outcome of a nuclear
war is analyzed. Again, the objective is to determine the extent, if
any, of Soviet superiority and suggest alternative U.S. measures.
(Chapter III)
4. With the emphasis on minimizing damage in a nuclear war, the
notion of limited nuclear war and civil defense are examined. War-
fighting thus includes a theory of damage limitation. (Chapter IV)
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5. The prospects for fighting a future nuclear war with respect
to the influence of advanced weapons, such as lasers and modern ICBMs,
are examined. In this case the nature of future nuclear war-fighting is
assessed. (Chapter V)
6. A brief series of conclusions are given as to the character,
both theoretical and functional, of war-fighting. Further analysis
suggests alternative deployments to increase the U.S. ability to win a
nuclear war.
CHAPTER I
A PROPOSED WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGY
The Strategy Defined
An effective strategy for fighting a nuclear war is composed of
two factors: first, that nuclear weapons be used only to defeat the
enemy, and second, that the enemy is deterred from nuclear war by the
threat of political defeat. If it is to offer coherent guidelines for
the execution of a nuclear war, this strategy requires nuclear forces
that are flexible, hardened, and dispersed; defensive measures to blunt
the enemy attack, confuse the enemy, or simply make the attack difficult
and its outcome more uncertain; and lastly, nuclear reserve forces to
meet all likely threats. With accurate nuclear delivery systems, it
is probable that all targets of military value in the United States and
Soviet Union are targeted for destruction in a nuclear war. Thus, with
a war-fighting nuclear strategy, the destruction of military targets
and the political defeat of the enemy are essential.
If the United States is to revise its present nuclear strategy of
MAD and counterforce in favor of war-fighting, it is necessary to abo-
lish the following imperatives established by MAD. First, that a nation
should respond with massive countervalue and counterforce attacks against
the Soviet Union in the event of Soviet nuclear attack. Second, that
retaliation is to be swift, certain, and deadly with respect to counter-
value targets. And lastly, that victory is not possible because the
12
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level of destruction in a nuclear war precludes winning in the conven-
tional or historical sense.
Political Dimensions
With a strategy for fighting a nuclear war it is not necessary for
the United States to attack the Soviet Union only in retaliation. If
the United States does attack, however, either in a first or second
strike, then it does so in order to defeat the Soviet Union. As a poli-
tical strategy, therefore, it is implied that nuclear war is deterred
by the fear of political defeat. In this case, the Soviet Union fears
political defeat more than military defeat. In the latter, the victor
destroys enemy nuclear forces but not the political structure of the
system. This logic of nuclear war-fighting strategy is essential for
this study.
The first tactical objective of war-fighting is the destruction of
the enemy's ability to fight a nuclear war.^"^ First, the immediate
course of action is to destroy all nuclear forces that would otherwise
be used against, for example, the United States. With these forces
destroyed, the United States limits damage to itself to more manageable
levels. The second alternative is to destroy the command centers from
which the enemy directs the war in order to disrupt its decision-making
apparatus and communication channels. In a technical sense, this is
integral to the destruction of the enemy's war-fighting capability.
Third, it is necessary to destroy the enemy's protracted nuclear war-
fighting capability; that is, the ability to wage a nuclear war over
extended periods of time. In order to prevent this, the United States
14
optimally would destroy Soviet institutions producing nuclear weapons
and delivery systems, and all Soviet nuclear storage sites and stock-
piled weapons. Therefore, with a war-fighting strategy the purpose is
to destroy both the forces and the system that will guide their use in
war. Thus, the strategy is a comprehensive approach to nuclear war.
In order to clarify the second alternative, it is suggested that
the United States attack Soviet command and control centers in a nuclear
war. This attack makes it explicit to Soviet elites that they will pay
the same price, in terms of death and destruction, as the Soviet popu-
lation at large. Opponents of this attack argue that the United States
should not do this because, without central direction, nuclear war is
uncontrollable. Nuclear war, therefore, is more destructive than neces-
sary and the possibility of negotiation is decreased further.
The argument that the United States should not attack Soviet com-
mand centers is related to the idea that nuclear war is too destructive
to be waged without political control. However, the function of nuclear
strategy is to deter as well as to fight a war. If it is clear to
Soviet leaders that they are vulnerable to destruction, then nuclear war
is deterred. Further, from the strategic perspective, the destruction
of Soviet command centers is advantageous: as a system-dominant politi-
cal structure that emphasizes the vertical delegation of authority, the
Soviet Union is vulnerable to the chaos caused by a nuclear war.^^ As a
subsystem-dominant political structure that stresses horizontal and
autonomous decision-making, the United States is partially insulated from
the effects of command center destruction. Thus, the surviving units
in the United States are more capable of independent control than their
15
Soviet counterparts. Therefore, the threat to destroy Soviet command
centers deters nuclear war.
With this strategy, countervalue destruction is not the optimum
tactic given superior Soviet countervalue capabilities. If the Soviet
Union destroys U.S. forces in a nuclear war, surviving U.S. nuclear
forces cannot cause the massive countervalue destruction needed to
deter war. Therefore, the United States cannot threaten the Soviet
Union with equal countervalue destruction. The reason for this dispari-
ty is that the United States does not deploy nuclear weapons that are
large enough, with respect to yield, to totally devastate Soviet cities
and industries. Given the yield of U.S. SLBM warheads, approximately
40 kilotons, the United States does not want, by attacking Soviet cities
first, to force the Soviet Union to attack U.S. cities with warheads
with an average yield of 700 kilotons.
With a war-fighting strategy the United States would not launch
a nuclear aitack against the Soviet Union because any Soviet response
is likely to be more devastating. Further, the United States would
progressively disarm itself in the process. The United States is appar-
ently aware that it can deplete its nuclear forces unless it calculates
the value of destroying a particular target against the value of remain-
ing Soviet forces.^^ More importantly, in the present situation, the
United States is deterred from nuclear retaliation by more massive So-
viet retaliation.
In contrast to MAD and its stress on the destruction of Soviet
cities and industry, the avoidance of countervalue destruction is es-
sential to this strategy. Thus, only targets that weaken the Soviet
16
war-fighting capability would be attacked. The political dimension of
this strategy has no use for countervalue destruction because it is not
a rational and calculating way to fight a nuclear war. It is, however,
an emotional, revenge-oriented response. The latter is an anathema to
the proper exercise of nuclear war.
Is the war-fighting strategy a rational approach to nuclear war?
A rational nuclear war is fought for one or more of the following ob-
jectives: to defeat any enemy, to deter nuclear war before it can occur,
to prevent surrender by demonstrating a willingness to fight, and to
limit damage caused by a massive countervalue nuclear war. Counter-
value destruction is excluded because it is unproductive to kill people
when the principal source of enemy power is its nuclear arsenal. In
theory, nuclear war can be fought and won without killing even one
civilian. And this type of victory is far more rational than a "victory"
in which the victor faces tens or hundreds of millions of dead and in-
jured people.
Therefore, with a strategy of war-fighting killing civilians is
avoided because it is more rational to preserve the social and political
fabric of a nation. If it is not possible to win a nuclear war without
killing people, the war is useless.
But how does this apply to the United States in 1981? Since it
faces Soviet counterforce and countervalue superiority, the most ration-
al U.S. option is not to fight unless it wishes to lose. (The issue of
retaliation is another question to be addressed later.) It is not a
palatable choice, but the basis for a war-winning nuclear strategy is
suggested. Thus, the only missing ingredient for this strategy is the
17
proper nuclear arsenal.
It is irrational to fight a nuclear war thinking that the enemy is
deterred by the threat of "unacceptable damage." As noted in the intro-
duction, the Soviet definition of "unacceptable damage" probably dif-
fers from that of the United States. This means, therefore, that the
Soviet Union may see nuclear bluff for what it is.
Thus, on the basis of war-fighting the notion that nuclear weapons
are too destructive to be used is rejected. With MAD, nuclear weap-
ons cannot be used for rational reasons. However, with war-fighting
nuclear weapons can (and will) be used to produce a meaningful advantage.
Thus, excessive destructive power applies only to a nation that thinks
nuclear retaliation and punishment will deter any aggressor. If a na-
tion thinks in terms of political objectives, such as victory, nuclear
options are more thinkable. Thus, nuclear weapons should not be used
for frivolous purposes; however, the preservation of vital national in-
terests may require the waging of a nuclear war. And when a vital in-
terest is jeopardized, more palatable options than the destruction of
Soviet cities are suggested by this strategy.
Under what conditions is strategic nuclear war conceivable? First,
the rapid disintegration of the Middle East in an oil-induced war, with
the United States and Soviet Union on opposing sides, could precipitate
nuclear war. The United States would fight a nuclear war to safeguard
the oil supply of the Western industrialized nations. That the oil
supply might be superfluous immediately after the war does not affect
this evaluation.
Second, nuclear war could occur as a result of a conventional war
18
in Europe. For example, if either NATO or Warsaw Pact forces started
to lose a war, it is conceivable that, with the large deployments of
theater nuclear weapons in Europe, a conventional land battle could es-
calate to tactical nuclear war. From there the step to a central stra-
tegic nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR is possible.
For the opponents of a nuclear war-fighting strategy nuclear war
itself would be so destructive that only an insane person would fight
such a war. However, the proponents of this strategy say that nuclear
war, because it can occur for rational reasons, is not necessarily an
insane act. Thus, the question is whether a nation would act irrational-
ly during a war. If war occurs by accident or miscalculation then, ac-
cording to this strategy, nations would calmly and rationally end the
war as soon as possible. On the other hand, if war occurs for a politi-
cal reason it also would be conducted rationally until the specified
political objectives are attained.
Deterring Nuclear War
The first objective of a war-fighting strategy is to maintain de-
terrence. However praiseworthy and necessary this goal, the United
States is obligated both morally and politically to plan for nuclear
war. However, there is no logical or scientific way to demonstrate that
this strategy increases or decreases the incentive to fight a nuclear
war. But the strategy can make the costs of failure too high and the
probability of victory too low to justify a nuclear war. With this
strategy, nuclear war is deterred because neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union can escape the possibility of mutual devastation, and
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perhaps defeat.
With any strategy, possible courses of action are suggested, given
a particular event or series of events. Nuclear strategy, therefore,
cannot "cause" deterrence to fail except to the extent that a nation,
by virtue of planning, decides to respond rather than capitulate. If
the United States defines its strategy so as to undermine the prospects
for Soviet victory, then deterrence is preserved.
One example of such interaction between strategy and deterrence is
nuclear reserve forces: a larger U.S. reserve force increases the prob-
ability that the Soviet Union is deterred from war. Conversely, a
smaller U.S. reserve force is less likely to increase the chance of war.
Why? If the Soviet Union realizes that the United States can destroy
essential elements of the Soviet war-fighting capability in response to
Soviet aggression, then it would not attack. Thus, the relationship
between deterrence and war-fighting strategy is quite solid.
If nuclear war is not deterred, then the United States should pre-
pare a tactic that will be termed an "assured counterforce exchange."
The essential elements of this tactic are outlined as follows. First,
the ability to deter nuclear war would shift from the destruction of
countervalue to counterforce targets, with emphasis on rapid counter-
force destruction.^^ Even limited nuclear attacks against U.S. ICBMs,
for example, would result in the destruction of Soviet nuclear and con-
ventional power through retaliation. Thus, the Soviets are compelled to
avoid war. The exception to this and all rules of strategy is that a
nation would fight to protect vital interests.
Second, an "assured counterforce exchange" is not designed to attack
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countervalue targets, except as a minor option. There is no reason to
destroy such targets when U.S. and Soviet populations can be useful
assets to the victor after the war. The purpose of strategy, there-
fore, is not to deter by the threat of countervalue destruction but by
the threat of total political and military defeat. Since the defeated
nation may offer a range of resources that may be required by the victor,
such destruction is not rational.
Third, an "assured counterforce exchange" does not create an incen-
tive to attack first because, if defeat means destruction of its nuclear
forces, then the United States and Soviet Union would not be willing to
attack first. With respect to deterrence, this tactic perserves peace.
If, however, any nation becomes superior, then the incentive to strike
first increases. But if the inferior nation prepares its nuclear forces
to destroy large numbers of the attacker's unfired ICBMs, for example,
then the attacker still faces an uncertain conclusion to the war. There-
fore, deterrence prevails.
Lastly, the incentive to destroy civilian populations is reduced
with this tactic. If the outcome of nuclear war is uncertain, if the
risks of war are greater than the benefits of victory, and if there is
no reason to destroy people, then deterrence is secure. Thus, if an
opponent is properly prepared to retaliate with an "assured counter-
force exchange," any attacker would be forced to think about failure.
With a war-fighting strategy deterrence is more secure. The reason
is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can successfully
disarm or defeat the other. The most critical determinant of the stra-
tegy is the desire to avoid defeat. Such deterrence is reminiscent of
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the halcyon days of MAD when the United States, and perhaps the Soviet
Union as well, believed that nuclear war was avoidable because the
threat of countervalue destruction existed. Now, however, war is deter-
red by the threat of total defeat.
Nuclear Stabi 1 i ty and the Strategy
As a rational, and as suggested by this study preferred, nuclear
strategy, war-fighting does not create the instability associated with
launching a nuclear first-strike in a crisis. Neither the United States
nor the Soviet Union is forced to launch in order to avoid the destruc-
tion of its forces. Opponents of war-fighting, however, argue that it
forces the Soviet Union to strike first because it is particularly vul-
1 o
nerable to a preemptive first-strike. With 75 per cent of the total
nuclear megatonnage on its ICBMs, the Soviet Union would be virtually
disarmed if it lost them. It is, therefore, safer for the United States
to wait until information about the nuclear attack confirms that retalia-
tion is indeed necessary.
But this confuses a strategy for fighting nuclear wa'^ with a first-
strike strategy that seeks only to destroy enemy forces first in a pre-
emptive attack to prevent retaliation. With a war-fighting strategy,
however, nuclear retaliation destroys all sources of enemy nuclear
power, but not necessarily in a first-strike. This confusion causes
many to reject a war-fighting strategy as a progenitor of nuclear war.
The irony is that it decreases the probability of nuclear war and re-
inforces nuclear stability because the chance of success is decreased.
The classic example of pressure to launch nuclear forces
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preemptively is a confrontation in which the United States and Soviet
Union are balanced on the brink of nuclear war. It is possible to de-
tennine when an adversary, say the United States or Soviet Union, is
about to launch its nuclear forces judging by telecommunications traf-
fic. Since the enemy knows that a successful counterforce strike would
destroy the ability to retaliate, it is logical to assume that this
strategy appears to invite nuclear war because the risk of waiting is
defeat.
However logical this seems to be, with a strategy of war-fighting
preemptive attack against a well -prepared enemy is not suggested. The
chance of war is not increased as long as such nations have equal war-
fighting capabilities. It may be, however, that the strategy increases
the U.S. ability to launch a first strike. If this is the price of nu-
clear readiness, then it is acceptable. Soviet nuclear strategy notwith-
standing, the United States just does not have a choice.
The Probability of Nuclear War
A strategy of nuclear war-fighting must address the probability of
nuclear war. For this strategy, nuclear war is not very likely to occur
because the United States and Soviet Union want to avoid wars that would
cause tremendous civilian and military destruction. This is not to say
the United States and Soviet Union will never fight a nuclear war, but,
however improbable it may seem, it can happen.
How is a strategy for fighting a nuclear war related to the proba-
bility of war? Three factors seem to be important: "spasm" nuclear
retaliation, "automatic" nuclear attacks, and countervalue attacks.
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In contrast to MAD, according to q war-ficjhting nuclear strategy,
it is suggested that a nation ought to refrain from "spasm" countervalue
nuclear attacks against the enemy. The purpose of this strategy is to
threaten the enemy with the destruction of his valued military assets at
a time and place of the adversary's choosing. The immediate "spasm"
attack, in which the attacked nation launches its nuclear forces against
the attackers cities and industries, is instead replaced by retaliation
over a protracted period of time. Thus, nuclear attacks can be immediate
as well as protracted, lasting weeks or months after the initial attack.
The effect on the enemy's strategy is to increase uncertainty about the
scale of the retaliation, its timing and duration. For example, if the
United States could conduct sustained nuclear operations over six months
to a year after the initial Soviet attack, the Soviet Union could not
begin its recovery program. Therefore, the nation facing the possibility
of protracted nuclear war is less likely to start one. This hesitation
helps to maintain deterrence.
Is there any reason to support "automatic" U.S. retaliation? Ac-
cording to MAD this maintains deterrence because the enemy is certain
about the timing of retaliation. Thus, for MAD, no rational opponent
wishes to cause its own destruction. The alternative, however, is to
suggest that the United States forestall further attacks until the moment
is right. When does this occur?
First, the United States should attack only after assessing its
losses and remaining forces. What is the sense of retaliation if the
United States loses, for example, 90 per cent of its nuclear forces?
Second, the United States should retaliate only after the size and
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composition of Soviet reserve forces are assessed. With such informa-
tion, the United States could attack Soviet targets at a level commen-
surate with surviving U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces. Suppose the United
States retaliates immediately after a Soviet attack in order to show de-
termination and equalize damage. This might be a waste of precious re-
sources if U.S. and Soviet forces are not equal. Thus, retaliation does
not have the desired effect with respect to equality if it does not pre-
serve parity.
A third factor to be examined is countervalue retaliation. The
United States must ask if the threat of a countervalue war deters the
Soviet Union. Further, does the United States benefit from such an at-
tack? First, the United States must accept that the Soviet Union, as
noted in the introduction, does not define "unacceptable damage" in the
same way. Thus, one cannot measure deterrence in terms of civilian
losses. Second, the United States can only lose if the Soviet counter-
value attack is more costly and destructive. Having deployed nuclear
forces with substantially larger warheads, the Soviet Union could in-
flict more destruction in U.S. cities than the United States could in
Soviet cities. Therefore, with this strategy the United States is not
advised to attack Soviet cities.
Limited Nuclear War
Nuclear war can be avoided if the potential antagonist faces an
enemy that is prepared, both physically and strategically, to fight a
protracted nuclear war. It is not simply concerned with punishing the
attacker or balancing numbers of civilian casualties, but with bringing
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the war to a satisfactory conclusion. Thus, the question of limiting
a nuclear war is more political than strategic, and concerns the will
to limit the war when further action is useless or too costly to bear.
Therefore, the following options are presented as tactics for limiting
a nuclear war: surrender or capitulation before war begins; surrender
or capitulation during the war when destruction becomes too great to
bear; termination after attacking counterforce targets only; termina-
tion after attacking countervalue targets only; and negotiations at any
time after the war begins.
It is by no means "irrational," "immoral," or "unpatriotic" to sug-
gest surrender or capitulation when the probable adversary, in this
case the Soviet Union, can win the war by virtue of its superior counter-
force or countervalue capabilities. With this strategy, it is recommend-
ed that the United States develop war-fighting nuclear forces equal, if
not superor, to those of the Soviet Union. If the United States is in-
ferior, then all rhetoric to the contrary, it will not, in the moment of
truth, fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union if the latter can dis-
arm U.S. ICBM, SLBM, and bomber forces and simultaneously attack cities.
At that point, there is no chance zo rearm; the United States would be
defeated short of war.
It is unrealistic to suggest that the United States would surrender
rather than fight. The United States has no choice but to fight because
it is a superpower that seeks to maintain that status. Furthermore, the
Soviet Union would never attack because the possibility of U.S. retalia-
tion, however remote, is enough to deter the Soviets. This argument
may be convincing and even reassuring, but it misses the point of nuclear
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deterrence. Nuclear war cannot be fought, no matter how determined a
nation sounds, if it does not have credible nuclear capabilities. Such
war would not forestall defeat but kill millions of people for no reason.
Therefore, the United States as a rational opponent would surrender.
In support of this conclusion consider Athen's surrender to Sparta,
German's surrender in World War I and II, and the Confederacy's surren-
der to the North in the U.S. Civil War. In each case, surrender occurs
when the price of further action exceeds what a nation can withstand.
In the second model, surrender occurs when a nation ceases to fight
after the war has begun. In contrast to the first option in which the
United States would surrender before beginning a futile nuclear war, in
this case it would surrender after a nuclear exchange. The criteria for
this decision rests on the costs of the first exchange: U.S. versus
Soviet losses, the size of U.S. and Soviet reserve forces, and the rela-
tive standing of the United States. Thus, the pressure to surrender
could be irresistable if a nation sees itself in a losing position. Al-
though surrender is not as "overt" as passing the sword from the defeat-
ed to the victorious general, unilateral cessation of hostilities by the
United States is symbolic, especially if the Soviet Union sustains less
casualties. In summary, nuclear war is limited if the United States or
the Soviet Union terminates hostilities before its nuclear arsenal is
depleted. This is, therefore, the^ definition of limited nuclear war.
Furthermore, nuclear war can be limited to counterforce exchanges.
For instance, the United States cannot fight a counterforce war without
a counterforce arsenal. When depletion of whatever counterforce weapons
the United States has occurs, it must either surrender or attack Soviet
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countervalue targets. Since the difference between counterforce and
countervalue weapons rests on warhead yield and accuracy, a nation could
attack cities with its smaller and less accurate warheads. This is the
most pertinent consideration with respect to the United States and
Soviet Union in 1981. With 70 per cent fewer counterforce weapons than
the Soviet Union, the United States is compelled to surrender rather
than attack Soviet cities. For an analysis of U.S. and Soviet war-
fighting capabilities corripare the last sections of Chapters I and II,
respectively.
The third option to limit nuclear war is to terminate after coun-
tervalue attacks. When would a nation surrender rather than fight a
countervalue nuclear war? The answer is when the enemy can inflict sub-
stantially more countervalue destruction. Aside from the moral responsi-
bility to protect one's people from senseless destruction, the destruc-
tion of a population does not serve any political purpose. Thus, it is
rational to surrender before beginning, or continuing, an exchange with
an adversary who has superior countervalue capabilities.
The fourth option with respect to limiting a nuclear war concerns
negotiations during the war. Negotiations could commence either before
the war begins (the first option), after the war progresses to one or
multiple nuclear exchanges (the second option), or during counterforce
and countervalue exchanges (the third and fourth options). In all cases
termination is directly related to superiority, whether perceived or
real. Therefore, the primary factor in calculations of surrender is the
ability to gain a significant goal in the war. If the war cannot serve
a realistic political purpose, then the process of surrender is
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accelerated.
However, this is not intended to suggest that surrender is the only
option available to the United States, but that radical changes in U.S.
nuclear strategy and deployments are necessary. Therefore, the preced-
ing conditions would be invalid if the United States expanded its nu-
clear war-fighting capabilities and revised its strategy along the lines
proposed here. The United States can force the Soviet Union to surren-
der if it threatens the Soviet Union with a similar level of destruction.
It is unclear whether a nation can remain rational after it is at-
tacked with nuclear weapons, and thus whether it would launch a "spasm"
attack. However, with this strategy for fighting a nuclear war, it is
suggested that rationality prevails at all times. However destructive
the attack is, a nation would rationally determine if retaliation is
necessary. The political dimension of war-fighting is always kept in
mind. Thus, an irrational response, such as a "spasm" countervalue
attack, is avoided.
Whether a nation exercises rational control over its nuclear forces,
and particularly its command complex, depends on the protection of that
system against nuclear attack, and its' ability to assess damage rapid-
ly. The objective of limited nuclear war is to prevent unmanageable
damage and retain control over the war. Thus, nuclear war can be limit-
ed because the United States and Soviet Union probably see some value in
measured responses.
A Theory of Victory iji Nuclear War
If the strategy is to be successful it must suggest how a nation
29
might win a nuclear war. There is a general consensus among the propo-
nents of war-fighting that a nuclear war can be won with minimal destruc-
tion.'^" Therefore, a nation can recover from a nuclear war. Winning a
nuclear war is defined as an outcome that does not, in terms of counter-
value destruction to a nation's political and economic infrastructure,
preclude recovery. In order to understand the notion of victory in nu-
clear war, the following issues are essential: the notion that nuclear
war is not necessarily suicidal, the simultaneous destruction of enemy
nuclear forces and protection of one's population, recognition that de-
feat is worse than the effects of a nuclear war, and an analysis of the
meaning of defeat.
The most fundamental stumbling block to an acceptance of a war-
fighting strategy is the belief that nuclear war is suicidal. At the
most basic level, this strategy involves a rethinking of the meaning of
victory. For those who ; do not accept the notion that nuclear war is
winnable, the overwhelming catastrophe of a nuclear war undermines
"manageable" destruction. Manageability refers to destruction that is
not fatal to a nation. Thus, MAD did not enjoy popularity for the last
three decades for its theme of deterrence, but for the idea that nuclear
war means the end of modern civilization. Nuclear war, therefore, can-
not serve any useful political purpose. And its acceptance as a practi-
cal option is an anathema to MAD.
However, with a war-fighting strategy nuclear war is winnable if a
nation protects its civilian population from the aftereffects of war.
Thus, protecting one's people is perhaps the most important aspect of
winning. But even this tactic is greeted with contempt by those who say
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that people cannot be protected against a determined opponent using nu-
clear weapons.
In order to accept the idea that nuclear is not suicidal, that it
can be won in a meaningful way, and that nuclear war can be a useful
policy option, it is necessary to propose that defeat in nuclear war is
less desirable than any form of nuclear devastation. Therefore, the
primary goal of this strategy is victory.
What does it mean to the United States to be defeated by the Soviet
Union in a nuclear war? The dimensions of defeat range logically from
simple surrender to total occupation. The latter seems to fit the
Soviet political culture and its recent history. If the Soviet Union
defeats the United States, the possibility of U.S. political recovery
is remote. There is the hope, however, that the costs of subjugation
would exceed even Soviet capabilities. Afghanistan is illustrative
since it indicates Soviet ineptitude in protracted, counterinsurgency
guerrilla warfare. Therefore, it is likely that the Soviet Union would
eliminate the elites, political, military, and corporate, of the United
States, and that democratic politics, as it is known in 1981, would
cease to exist. Further, nuclear superiority in the post-war world
means that areas of resistance in the United States could be destroyed
very easily. However, as all invaders in the past have discovered, oc-
cupation and control are very difficult in a large country.
If the roles were reversed with the United States defeating the
Soviet Union, it is likely that a similar political "transformation"
would occur in the Soviet Union. If the United States does not occupy
the Soviet Union, then the dismembennent of the Soviet elite system and
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its highly centralized political process is conceivable. The point is
that nuclear war does not change the basic rule of warfare: the defeat-
ed is at the total mercy of the victor, and that it may never again
exist as it did in the past.
U.S. War-Fighting Capabilities
The measure of nuclear war-fighting capability is the ability to
destroy hardened targets; that is, ICBM silos that are constructed of
steel -reinforced concrete and capable of withstanding all but a direct
hit. Thus, the "yield-accuracy" index of a warhead describes its war-
fighting capability. Since even the smallest strategic nuclear warhead,
roughly 40 kilotons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, can destroy a silo in
a direct hit, there is a boundary for assessing war-fighting effective-
ness. Thus, an effective war-fighting nuclear warhead has an accuracy
(CEP) of 0.2 nm or less and a yield of 200 kilotons or greater. Uncer-
tainty about actual accuracy in war, and fluctuations in the earth's
magnetic field as ICBMs fly over the North Pole, reduce confidence in
hard-target destruction. Thus, an attack, unless the warheads have
very large yields (such as the one megaton Soviet ICBM warheads), would
use two warheads to increase the probability of destruction.
The U.S. ICBM force contains 1,054 ICBMs, of which 550 are Minute-
man Ills, 450 Minutement lis, and 54 Titan lis. The Minuteman (MM) III
is MIRVed with three 170 kiloton warheads and has a CEP (circular error
probable, which is a measure of warhead accuracy. This refers to the
area within which the warhead is expected to land 50 per cent of the
time) of 0.12 nm (nautical miles). The low number of warheads on the
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MM III reduces its' war-fighting capability because it can destroy at
most three Soviet ICBMs. However, a high confidence attack probably
targets two warheads per Soviet ICBM and thus further reduces its war-
fighting potential
.
The Minuteman II ICBM carries a 1 or 2 megaton nuclear warhead and
has a CEP of 0.34 nm. Therefore, its' hard- target kill capability is
marginal, if not non-existent, because the CEP is too high. Third,
there are 54 Titan II ICBMs. Although it is deployed with a 9 megaton
warhead, it is ineffective as a war-fighting weapon because its CEP
is 0.8 nm. The Titan II is thus likely to attack Soviet cities, a role
that is well -suited given its CEP and yield. If the Titan II were more
accurate, it could be used to attack Soviet command centers, especially
those buried deep underground.
The second war-fighting weapon in the U.S. arsenal to be considered
is the SLBM. The U.S. SLBM force of 41 submarines deploys two types of
SLBMs: 160 Polaris A-3 missiles, each having three 200 kiloton warhead
with a CEP of 0.5 nm; and 480 Poseidon SLBMs with ten 40 kiloton war-
heads and a CEP of 0.25 nm. Although the Polaris is designed to attack
cities and similar countervalue targets, its CEP and yield are not ac-
curate enough to destroy hard-targets.
In order to assess the war-fighting capability of the Poseidon
SLBM further, its' yield and accuracy must be considered. Since the
probable target in a nuclear war, given the nature of a war-fighting
strategy, is a hardened ICBM silo, command bunker, or similar military
installation, an attacking warhead must detonate close enough to the
target to create destructive overpressures, heat and blast. If the
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warhead is too inaccurate or the yield too small, the target is not
destroyed. Thus, the primary weakness of the Poseidon is its yield.
If its CEP were reduced to 0.1 nm, then the 40 kiloton yield would be
sufficient. At present, however, it cannot destroy Soviet ICBM silos.
Against countervalue targets, the Poseidon SLBM is somewhat more
effective.
Representing "state-of-the-art" technology in SLBM guidance and
warhead design, the Trident I SLBM is a very competent war-fighting in-
strument. The Trident I carries 10 MIRVed 100 kiloton nuclear warheads
and has a CEP of 0.15 nm. When the Trident I is deployed in larger
numbers than the 16 now at sea, U.S. war-fighting capabilities will be
more credible.^^
The third war-fighting weapon in the United States' nuclear arsenal
is the strategic nuclear bomber. Although it is the least capable U.S.
war-fighting weapon, the bomber continues to be deployed in large num-
bers. There are 316 B-52 bombers carrying a mix of gravity bombs and
SRAMS; the SRAM, short-range attack missile, is a supersonic missile
that would attack Soviet air defenses notably radar and surface-to-air
(SAM) missile sites, with a 200 kiloton warhead. Although the United
States continues to upgrade the B-52's electronic defenses, its 30
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year old airframe reduces its war-fighting effectiveness.*-*-
The United States also deploys the FB-111 which carries essentially
the same weapons mix as the B-52, but only 20 percent of its payload.
The major weakness of the FB-111 is that, unlike the B-52, it requires
inflight refuelling to reach the Soviet Union; the refuelling phase makes
the FB-111 quite vulnerable to destruction.
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The Soviet Union's air defense system of surface-to-air missiles,
fighter interceptors and radars is the most threatening to the B-52
(and FB-lIl). With the estimated 6 to 10 hours notice the Soviet Union
would receive of U.S. bomber attack, its air defenses have ample time
to be alerted. In such a hostile and lethal defensive environment
the number of U.S. strategic bombers reaching assigned targets is sub-
stantially less than an effective attack requires. Considering also
that the B-52 is best suited, with respect to its 24 megaton nuclear
bombs, to attack Soviet cities and less defended command centers, the
present U.S. bomber fleet is ineffective, obsolete and cumbersome for
a counterforce attack.
The total inventory of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons is in ex-
cess of 9,000, but the number of war-fighting capable warheads is
1,650. Those 1,650 warheads are deployed on the Minuteman III ICBM.
On the basis of optimistic analysis an attack against Soviet nuclear
targets by all other U.S. forces would be ineffective. However, on
the basis of pessimistic analysis, the United States would disarm
itself in an attack against Soviet war-fighting forces. The effective-
ness of U.S. nuclear attack against the Soviet Union depends on the
alert rates, survivability, and hardness of Soviet targets. With the
forces available to the United States, and the known characteristics
of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal (silo hardness, a hardened and
protected communication network, and the dispersion of its forces),
the United States could not destroy enough Soviet targets to achieve
a war-fighting and war-winning goal. The attack, however, would de-
plete U.S. forces and allow the Soviet Union to retain overwhelming
serve forces would be vastly superior to those of the United States-
with this superiority, the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war
CHAPTER II
A WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGY:
THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE
An Analysis of Soviet Nuclear Strategy
The Soviet Union seems less concerned with MAD than the United
States, and therefore rejects the notion that there are limits to usable
nuclear power. Thus, the Soviet Union deploys forces that are designed
to strike first and seize the initiative. Considering the Soviet
Union's war-fighting and war-winning nuclear strategy, the Soviet
Union apparently believes that nuclear war can be won if the political
and military Infrastructure of the opponent is destroyed as quickly
and effectively as possible.
Therefore, Soviet nuclear war-fighting systems are now superior
to those of the United States. One explanation for this is the Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962. While the United States deduced that the
threat of nuclear war alone deterred the Soviet Union from further ag-
gression, the Soviet Union appears to believe that the United States
prevailed because it enjoyed both strategic nuclear and conventional
superiority. Thus, the United States "won" the contest because its'
superior forces would inflict more destruction than the Soviet Union
could inflict. In sum, the Soviet Union learned that the price of
inferiority is capitulation . Often quoted Soviet remarks assert that
it is determined never to be on the losing, or weaker, side again.
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It appears the Soviet Union is determined to deter U.S. nuclear
retaliation in the next crisis. If modern international relations is
viewed as a series of "crisis curves" indicating an increasing proba-
bility of intensely violent periods, then the Soviets probably believe
that nuclear war is likely to occur within the next twenty years. This
is not to suggest that the Soviet Union "wants" a nuclear war to occur,
but only to suggest that its' nuclear deployments are designed to win
should war be necessary. Thus, the Soviet Union stresses the "shock
potential" of its forces to immobilize the United States and perhaps
induce it to capitulate. This also means that the United States can-
not retaliate because its forces can be destroyed by the Soviet Union
in a counterforce nuclear war.
The Soviet Union appears to believe that it can win a central
strategic nuclear war at this time.^^ Furthermore, if nuclear wars
can be won or lost, then it intends to win. It is even more signifi-
cant that the Soviet Union does not see nuclear war as suicidal, but
rational. Nuclear war, therefore, is never excluded as an option.
The Soviets also appear to think that survival after a nuclear war de-
pends on the ability to mitigate its effects. Thus, to win a nuclear
war a nation must first survive it. Given Soviet offensive and defen-
sive capabilities, the Soviet determination to deploy survivable, yet
powerful, nuclear forces is not likely to be reversed.
The Soviet quest for a war-winning capability seems rooted in a
belief that "the best deterrent is a war-winning capabil ity. "27 Whether
the Soviet Union believes that nuclear war can be won is perhaps a sec-
ondary issue. The real issue is whether the Soviets can. A nuclear
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war-winning capability, however, need not be demonstrated as long as
there is a belief that it exists. Thus, such a capability seems to
rest on the assumption that this threat is the most effective way to
deter nuclear war. The Soviet Union never specified how a nuclear
war could be fought and won. However, this is not to suggest that it
cannot do so.
To circumvent uncertain information about actual Soviet plans, its
preoccupation with preemptive first-strike attacks at least implies
that the Soviet Union plans to attack first in a nuclear war. Thus,
the Soviet Union apparently see deterrence as a function of war-fighting
nuclear forces. Furthermore, it rejects the notion of mutual vulnera-
bility because this reduces political control in nuclear war and intro-
duces a fatalism that is inconsistent with the historical inevitability
that is part of Soviet ideology. Since the Soviets say that war be-
tween opposing systems is inevitable, prudence compels it to design
forces for winning.
Therefore, the Soviet Union deploys forces that reinforce its'
ability to win a nuclear war. Counterforce ICBMs, civil defense shel-
ters for Soviet elites and industrial workers, hardened and dispersed
industrial assets, civil defense training for its population, and ag-
gressive research and development in ballistic missile defense are note-
worthy examples. The Soviet Union emphasizes the protection of its*
civilian population, because, as V. I. Lenin notes, the proletariat is
the backbone of the socialist state.
An interesting difference between U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy
is that the Soviet Union does not deal with "slow-motion" counterforce
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wars, demonstration attacks, and limited nuclear options. It ignores
these purely Western ideas, and simply states that all available forces
are used to ensure a successful outcome. The United States, however,
stresses these ideas and thus limits such conceptualization to theoreti-
cal issues. Judging from Soviet statements, it views nuclear war as a
serious and conceivable, albeit radical, option. If the Soviet Union
views nuclear war seriously, the United States is therefore well-advised
to do the same.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union apparently thinks that it can survive
a nuclear war and emerge the most powerful nation. Thus, if the Soviets
believe they can limit losses to the twenty-five million lost in World
War II and if the political gain is significant, then nuclear war seems
to be a rational option. As von Clausewitz notes, war is an extension
?9
of politics. For the Soviet Union this is essential. Accordingly,
the Soviet Union appears to possess the forces necessary to win a war.
But the question is when will the Soviet Union gain the power to do so.
For those who view the direction of Soviet capabilities with alarm, 1982
is the benchmark for Soviet strategic superiority.
The focal point of Soviet strategy is the ability to disrupt U.S.
forces. First, the ability to destroy U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers
reduces the power of U.S. retaliation. Second, Soviet nuclear deploy-
ments undermine U.S. nuclear strategy, which is essentially second-
strike, defensive, and retaliatory. The value of a second-strike is
further diminished by large Soviet reserve forces. Third, Soviet
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Strategy stresses the first-strike attack in nuclear war.''" By "going
first," the Soviet Union can seize the advantage and reduce the
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probability of U.S. retaliation. The Soviet Union also seems to believe
that by striking first it can limit damage to itself and thus survive.
Although damage limitation is disparaged by some as ineffective and
thus a waste of time and resources, Soviet capabilities in this field
threaten to undermine U.S. nuclear strategy.
A central element of a first-strike, war-survival strategy is the
ability to disrupt the command, control and communication (C-^) system
of the adversary. Therefore, a Soviet preemptive nuclear attack would
probably target data links in the U.S. system: ground transmitters,
communication lines, command bunkers in Virginia, Maryland, Colorado,
Nebraska, Florida, California, Washington, D.C., and Canada. Thus, in
the United States the attack would be quite extensive. U.S. early warn-
ing systems, including the Defense Satellite System, also would be tar-
geted. Since the launch to impact time for an ICBM is thirty minutes
and seven to ten minutes for SLBMs, the destruction of the U.S. C^
system, or at least substantial degradation, would severely inhibit
rapid U.S. response.
As a critical attribute of a war-winning nuclear strategy, nuclear
war, no matter how destructive, is seen as winnable. Thus, "meaningful"
victory can be attained only if proper precautions are taken. However,
opponents of a war-winning strategy argue that even the Soviet "recog-
nizes that such a war would be an unprecedented disaster. "^^ With this
in mind, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could "emerge ... victor-
ious (and) less totally destroyed than 'capitalism' ."32 The power,
both psychological and functional, of such a Soviet strategy strains
U.S. second-strike capabilities to limit. For example, Team "B" of the
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U.S. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concludes that the Soviet
Union seeks "victory not deterrence, superiority in weapons rather than
sufficiency, and offensive, perhaps preemptive, operations rather than
retaliation. The report is also critical of the traditional view
that nuclear war is too destructive to be contemplated, that there can
be no winners, and that superiority is meaningless. The point is that
the Soviet Union apparently thinks that nuclear war can be won, and
thus it poses a severe threat to the United States.
The emphasis in Soviet nuclear strategy on fighting and winning a
nuclear war does not imply the Soviet Union "wants" such a war to occur
or that it does not understand the potential destructiveness of nuclear
war. It is clear, however, that it sees deterring nuclear war as its
primary political objective. And rationality demands no less. There-
fore, the Soviet Union sees a war-fighting and war-winning nuclear capa-
bility as the best way to deter nuclear war. No serious analyst can
argue that the Soviet Union or the United States for that matter, would
fight a nuclear war without sufficient cause even if it possessed nu-
clear superiority. Nuclear war is just too destructive to be fought
without good cause. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union ap-
parently view nuclear war as an unacceptable policy alternative in nor-
mal times. It is also important to note that, on the basis of its mili-
tary literature, the Soviet Union does not suggest that nuclear war is
an inminent event. The United States and Soviet Union, however, would
most certainly fight a nuclear war if vital interests were at stake.
But many ignore, or at least discount, this possibility despite the ex-
tremely competitive politics of these radically different ideological
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systems. In this world, given that U.S. and Soviet foreign policies
are mutually hostile with respect to virtually every issue of concern,
nuclear war can happen. If the Soviet Union apparently prepares to
fight and win a nuclear war, then the United States should do the same.
It is apparent that the Soviet Union probably views the potential
destruction of a nuclear war between the United States and itself as
reason enough to avoid it, as long as such avoidance takes into account
certain political realities. For example, that the Soviet Union would
not surrender rather than fight a nuclear war. But more importantly,
the Soviet Union stresses a war-fighting capability to deter the United
States. Thus, the Soviet Union probably views nuclear war as an accept-
able choice if the purpose is to preserve its political and social sys-
tem. Therefore, it is understandable that recovery is a dominant theme
in Soviet nuclear strategy.
Although there is strong evidence that the Soviet Union seeks to
win a nuclear war if it must fight one, it is commonplace to find this
conclusion dismissed as patent nonsense. The basis for this argument
is that the Soviet Union, whether or not it agrees with this, cannot
survive and recover from a nuclear war. Neither can the United States,
for that matter. The point, however, is that from the Soviet perspec-
tive nuclear war is seen as an extension of politics. If nuclear war
is fought for a clear political purpose, then even catastrophic loss is
not necessarily intolerable or irrational. For example, the United
States was willing apparently to fight an "irrational" nuclear war in
order to preserve deterrence under MAD. Therefore, a nation would
fight a nuclear war and accept the losses thereof if the stakes are
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high enough. Since it is suggested by historical data that nations
have fought wars that involved unexpectedly high levels of destruction,
it is clear that nuclear war can occur.
The Soviet Nu clear Threat
The Soviet Union's war-fighting, offensive and war-winning strate-
gy may produce substantial political benefits, including strategic
superiority and the ability to recover from a nuclear war. The objec-
tive thus is to deplete enemy nuclear forces in order to prevent, or
at least decrease, the number of warheads that will strike the Soviet
Union in retaliation. Therefore, counterforce nuclear strikes are an
essential part of Soviet nuclear strategy.
Although the United States does not accept, either in theory or
in practice, the primary rationales of a nuclear war-fighting strategy,
the Soviet Union continues to progress in this field. For instance, the
United States could not, given its present or foreseeable nuclear capa-
bility, launch a credible and disarming nuclear strike against Soviet
nuclear forces. Even recent U.S. nuclear deployments are not as capable
as those deployed Soviet nuclear forces. If the United States, however,
reversed this aversion to nuclear war-fighting, then it could destroy
Soviet nuclear forces in much the same way that the Soviet Union can.
Further, a strong measure of the offensive character of Soviet
nuclear strategy is the large number of nuclear warheads deployed on
its forces. The reason for such a large number is that no less is re-
quired if U.S. nuclear forces, its' ICBMs in particular, are to be
destroyed in a first-strike attack. If the Soviet Union can maximize
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its threat to U.S. nuclear forces, not only may it force the United
States to backdown in a nuclear war, but it may be able to preserve its
national, political
, economic, and military structures in a nuclear war.
Therefore, a war-fighting nuclear strategy is entirely consistent with
traditional Soviet military thinking, and fits its unique cultural and
historical experiences.
Soviet First -Strike Capabilities
With a counterforce and war-fighting nuclear strategy in operation,
a first-strike attack by either the United States (only in theory) or
the Soviet Union is a very plausible scenario today. Usually occurring
during an international crisis of great proportions, a first-strike
attack involves the destruction of the enemy's ICBM, SLBM and strategic
bomber forces. The purpose is to destroy enough nuclear forces so that
second-strike retaliation is not possible for the attacked nation. With
retaliation precluded, the attacking nation becomes superior and thus
wins the nuclear war.
It may be argued that nuclear forces capable of first-strike at-
tacks Increase the value of nuclear war and increase the probability
that it will occur. For example, the development of more accurate ICBMs,
the MX is a case in point, raises the value of nuclear attacks because
success is guaranteed. However, appealing this "intuitive" argument
may be, there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear forces affect, in
any sense, the probability of nuclear war. But it is conceivable that
the Soviet Union, if it has strategic superiority, can cause crisis
instability if the United States fears that its ICBMs are vulnerable to
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destruction. Therefore, a theme of this work is that no weapon or
capability can affect, that is increase or decrease, the probability of
nuclear war as long as its deployment is syiunetrical
.
It is argued that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
could ever deliver a successfully, a totally disarming first-strike
attack. The issue is not a first-strike attack that totally disarms an
adversary, but an attack that destroys a significant portion of the
enemy's nuclear forces. Further, even a "successful" first-strike at-
tack would mean that the United States could launch a devastating retal-
iatory attack against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the notion that the
United States and Soviet Union cannot effectively disarm each other is
correct only in the narrowest sense: a first-strike does not prevent
retaliation.
Further, the probability of a nuclear first-strike is very low be-
cause even minor destruction would be greater than all previous wars.
Therefore, a first-strike attack would be quite irrational. Thus,
there is no disagreement that a first-strike attack could be quite bene-
ficial if it were successful; the issue, however, is that success is
unlikely.
It is suggested that a U.S. nuclear war-fighting strategy would
increase the Soviet incentive to launch first in a crisis. The rationale
for this is that the Soviet Union would not let the United States attack
its nuclear forces. In support of this position, the silo-destroying
ICBM is cited as an example. There can be no other use for such a
weapon than to attack Soviet or U.S. silos in a first-strike. However,
the point of a war-fighting strategy is to increase the time available
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for crisis decision-making: if a nation can lose even half of its
forces in a first-strike, but still retain forces for retaliation, then
deterrence is secure. War-fighting nuclear forces give it just such a
capability. Thus, for example, if the United States can destroy multi-
ple Soviet targets after a Soviet first-strike, U.S. retaliation is
certain. This certainty would force the Soviet Union to rethink its
plans for war.
It is also important to avoid collateral destruction in a first-
strike attack or in retaliation. For example, if the United States can
attack a Soviet military target at the periphery of a Soviet city with-
out accidentally destroying it, then the Soviet Union would not be
forced to retaliate against U.S. countervalue targets. As always, the
avoidance of countervalue destruction is essential for a war-fighting
strategy.
If a nation can destroy enemy targets with impunity in a first-
strike, then it has what may be called a "preclusive first-strike capa-
bility."'^^ This capability exists when a nation can destroy its* op-
ponents nuclear forces without fearing retaliation. The attacker,
therefore, has more offensive and defensive power. This is analogous
to strategic superiority.
First, with a "preclusive first-strike capability" it is possible
to reduce the number of enemy warheads that can be used for retaliation.
For example, the advanced state of U.S. and Soviet high-energy laser
beam development, it is implied, means that full scale ballistic-
missile defense is possible. Second, the ability to protect targets
against nuclear attack with either active or passive defenses would
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negate the effects of attack. Consider, for example, the threat posed
by Soviet air defenses and civil defense. Third, there is the ability
to destroy a number of nuclear forces that is greater than the number
of attacking forces. Therefore, on the basis of this analysis, it is
likely that the Soviet Union will soon have a first-strike capability,
if it already does not. In fact, all Soviet strategic nuclear programs
have an undeniable first-strike character.
It is impossible to say that the Soviet Union will not use such
capabilities because this conclusion, dealing in the realm of inten-
tions, cannot be deduced. But it is fair to outline the implications
of this capability. At one extreme. Maxwell Taylor expresses strong
doubt that the Soviet Union would launch a first-strike attack because
the risk of U.S. retaliation is too high."^^ He also doubts that the
Soviet Union could destroy a significant number of U.S. ICBMs. Taylor,
in effect, voices a common viewpoint: the probability of Soviet nuclear
attack is very low. Richard Nixon, however, while reinforcing Taylor's
idea that Soviet nuclear attack is unlikely, suggests that the Soviet
Union could launch a first-strike attack if it wished. Lastly, Nixon
argues that the Soviet Union deters U.S. nuclear retaliation with the
threat of a first-strike attack.
Does the United States have a legitimate need for a first-strike
capability? Given that modern international relations is dependent on
the ability to exercise, or threaten the use of power in defense of
national interests, it is irrational and quite dangerous if the United
States cannot match Soviet nuclear capabilities, especially with
respect to the first-strike. Therefore, it is clear that the United
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States should have the ability to launch a tirst-strike attack and
fight a nuclear war to its logical conclusion: defeat of the Soviet
Union.
Since a Soviet first-strike, however, may destroy up to 90 per
cent of U.S. ICBMs and 60 per cent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. U.S.
retaliation is unlikely to occur. Simply, remaining nuclear forces
are not adequate for fighting a nuclear war. Therefore, if the United
States cannot retaliate after a Soviet first-strike attack, then the
possibility of surrender is raised. Thus, the point is that asymmetri-
cal first-strike capabilities do not preserve peace.
In contrast to the present, Paul Nitze defines strategic stability
to mean that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can, as a
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result of nuclear war, gain a post-attack advantage. This definition
is criticized, however, by Alan Tonelson because the realities of a
post first-strike world are independent of first-strike factors. "^^
Thus, according to Tonelson, Nitze 's model is inadequate because it
rests on a mathematical model that cannot account for attack uncertain-
ties and exaggerates the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense. Nitze,
however, suggests that perceived vulnerabilities after a Soviet first-
strike attack would deter any U.S. retaliation because it woUld be use-
less with respect to political or military gain. In effect, Nitze is
confirming the utility of a war-fighting strategy: a nation does not
attack or retaliate unless this will produce a significant gain.
A surprise attack in the 1980s can, if properly executed, affect
the outcome of a nuclear war such that the attacker may emerge victor-
ious. Since the United States can also survive if it takes proper
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precautions, the condition of the surviving powers is important. Aside
from the fact that a successful surprise attack can mean post-attack
advantage, the Soviet Union would have a substantial reserve force
after any conceivable first exchange. The United States, however, has
not planned accordingly, so it must plan to deter the Soviet Union with
other means. For example, the United States may plan to attack a com-
bination of countervalue and counterforce targets in retaliation. With
respect to Soviet nuclear strategy, its civil defense system may not
allow the United States to exercise a completely effective counter-
value strike. Therefore, given this apparent Soviet nuclear strategy
and the apparent U.S. nuclear plan, it is possible that the United
States may not deter the Soviet Union with the threat of retaliation.
Soviet nuclear strategy leads clearly to the first-strike option
in nuclear war. The explanation for this is that it must see some ad-
vantage to a first-strike attack against, for example, U.S. ICBMs.
It is impossible to conclude that the Soviet Union would not use this
capability, as it may indeed attack the United States if the circum-
stances are appropriate.
It is possible to find statements in Soviet military literature
affirming that victory in nuclear war should be swift and overwhelm- '
ing.^^ Thus, a political victory in nuclear war can mean the destruc-
tion of enemy nuclear forces, ostensibly in a first-strike. Therefore,
it is incorrect to suggest that the Soviet Union cannot see the first-
strike as a realistic option. There is no evidence to support the
"intuition," on the basis of Soviet military writings that the Soviet
Union could not see the first-strike as a potentially useful tactic in
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nuclear war. To suggest otherwise is to introduce MAD into U.S.
strategy.
The U.S. position, that first-strike capabilities confer only
limited political advantage, does not find support in Soviet strategy.
If the conclusions of Soviet military writing reflect actual Soviet
thinking, the emphasis on preemptive attacks is indeed threatening to
the United States. Further, given what has been said about the poten-
tial advantages to be gained from a first-strike capability, Soviet
nuclear strategy would be flawed if it did not believe that such a
capability can prove decisive.
Soviet Nuclear Superiority
An analysis of Soviet nuclear strategy, and its war-fighting
characteristics, suggests that the Soviet Union is committed to strate-
gic superiority for the 1980s and beyond. First, the Soviet Union
deploys nuclear forces designed primarily to attack and destroy U.S.
nuclear forces. Furthermore, these forces are deployed in such large
numbers that the United States could be overwhelmed in a nuclear ex-
change. Thus, it is not essential to be concerned with potential
Soviet vulnerability, but the issue instead should be U.S. inferiority
and vulnerability. To support this conclusion it is necessary only to
note that the United States cannot destroy Soviet forces. The reverse,
however, is not true.
Second, it cannot be assumed that because the United States does
not seek to destroy the Soviet Union in a nuclear war, then a priori
the Soviet Union does not seek to destroy the United States. To accept
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this conclusion means that the basic ideological premises of Soviet
behavior are ignored. The opposite, that the Soviet Union is cormiitted
to world domination, is not necessarily true either. Thus, it is unlike-
ly that the Soviet Union would fight a nuclear war in order to obtain
such domination. The point, however, is that the Soviet Union apparent-
ly seeks to win a nuclear war if it occurs.
What can be concluded about Soviet nuclear strategy? First, the
Soviet Union is apparently committed to and believes in nuclear super-
iority as a valuable tool in international relations. It is not parti-
cularly relevant to suggest that the Soviet Union, or the United States
for that matter, cannot achieve this. If the Soviet Union thinks that
it can, then it will act accordingly. Further, if the United States
believes that the Soviet Union cannot achieve superiority, then it is
likely to miscalculate and thus lose a war because the Soviet Union
had indeed achieved superiority.
Second, there is no reason to suggest that a war-fighting nuclear
strategy, as practiced by the Soviet Union, would not prove decisive
in a nuclear war. Again, if the Soviet Union believes that its war-
fighting nuclear strategy is essential to victory and recovery, then
it will act accordingly.
Lastly, the Soviet Union apparently thinks that nuclear wars can
be won and lost. On the basis of its recent history, it is conceivable
that the Soviet Union is willing to sacrifice people and industries in
order to defeat the United States in a nuclear war. There is, there-
fore, no means by which the Soviet Union can be proven wrong, short of
nuclear war.
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The Soviet War-Fighting Capability
Let us consider the Soviet Union's deployed war-fighting nuclear
arsenal. There are three counterforce-capable ICBMs: The SS-17,
SS-18, and SS-19. First, the SS-17 ICBM is deployed in two versions,
the mod 1 and mod 2. The mod 1 is MIRVed with four 750 kiloton war-
heads and has a CEP projected to be 0.24 nm. The mod 2 has a single
six megaton warhead and a CEP of 0.23 nm. Given the yield and accuracy
of the mod 1 it can effectively destroy hardened U.S. silos. The mod 2,
however, seems designed to attack U.S. command centers.
Second, the SS-18 is the most threatening war-fighting ICBM in
either the U.S. or Soviet nuclear arsenals. For ease of analysis, the
mod 1 and mod 3 are examined first because each carries one warhead.
The mod 1 warhead has a yield of 24 megatons and a CEP of 0.23 nm. The
mod 3 warhead has a yield of 20 megatons and a CEP of 0.19 nm. With
only 26 mod 1 and mod 3 deployed, these ICBMs are best suited to attack
particularly "difficult" targets: hardened underground installations
such as NORAD (North American Air Defense) in the Cheyenne Mountain com-
plex in Colorado.
The SS-18 mod 2 and mod 4 are the most threatening ICBMs with
respect to the U.S. ICBM force. The mod 2 is MIRVed with eight 900
kiloton warheads and each has a CEP of 0.23 nm. The mod 4 has ten
MIRVs with a yield of 500 kilotons and a CEP of 0.14 nm. Since the
total number of deployed SS-18 ICBMs (mod 2 and 4) is 214, the total
number of war-fighting nuclear warheads on this force is 1,712, Given
the substantially larger yield of the Soviet ICBM warheads, in comparison
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with the 1,500 warheads on U.S. ICCMs, the Soviet advantage is pro-
nounced. With this yield and accuracy, the SS-18 can destroy perhaps
90 per cent of the U.S. ICBM force if one warhead is assigned to attack
each silo. After this attack, approximately 1,200 Soviet ICBMs would
remain in their silos for later use.
Third, there is the SS-19 ICBM. The mod 1 is MIRVed with six 500
kiloton warheads and has a CEP of 0.21 nm. The mod 2 has a 10 megaton
warhead and a CEP of 0.14 nm. If the Soviet Union attacked U.S. ICBMs
with only its SS-18 mod 2 and mod 4 ICBMs it would, as noted, destroy
90 per cent of U.S. ICBMs. This would leave 210 mod 1 SS-19 ICBMs with
a total of 1,260 war-fighting warheads.
It seems quite likely that the SS-17 mod 1, SS-18 mod 1 and mod 3,
and the SS-19 mod 2 ICBMs are designed to attack "super-hard," "time-
critical" command centers in the United States. Note the following
similarities: unMlRVed, extremely high yields (between 6 and 24 mega-
tons), and CEPs between 0.14 and 0.23 nm. For example, in order to
destroy a command center, a nuclear warhead, say 20 megatons, would be
detonated at the surface above the target in question. This is a "ground-
burst" attack. The resulting crater would be about 0.5 nm in diameter,
depending on the soil type. Successive attacks, therefore, can "dig
out" any underground target, even a target buried in a mountain. There-
fore, it is clear that the U.S. NCA (National Command Authority) is in
jeopardy in a nuclear war. This is rarely cited.
If the Soviet Union attacked the U.S. ICBM fields with the SS-19
mod 1, it could destroy, again, approximately 90 per cent of the force.
This could leave the United States, after the attack, with 100 MM Ills
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and MM lis. The Soviet Union, however, would still have 240 SS-18, 140
SS-17, and 30 SS-19 ICBMs for an aggregate of 1,788 high-yield, ex-
tremely accurate ICBMs in their silos. This calculation excludes the
Soviet SLBM force, which offers no real war-fighting threat because
the CEPs are too high. Thus, the optimum use for Soviet, as well as,
U.S. SLBMs is against countervalue targets.
Therefore, it is absurd to suggest that the United States war-
fighting capability is equal to the Soviet's. The post-attack condi-
tion of U.S. nuclear forces means numerical
,
operational, and qualita-
tive inferiority with respect to the Soviet Union. The United States,
however, would have a larger number of warheads, (on its SLBM force),
but these have countervalue applications only. The more adverse trend
is that the U.S. and Soviet disparity would increase after further nu-
clear attacks. It would, therefore, be in the Soviet Union's interest
to fight a nuclear war, and more importantly to launch first in a
crisis because it can disarm the United States.
Further, it is likely that the Soviet Union would attack U.S.
bomber bases with its SLBMs, using a "depressed-trajectory" attack.
That is, an attack in which the normal ballistic trajectory of an SLBM
is flattened so that the normal flight time from launch to target,
about 15 to 20 minutes depending on the range, is reduced to between 8
and 10 minutes. With time compressed to this level, U.S. bombers would
either be destroyed on the ground or would be "blow down" in flight by
nuclear blasts. Thus, the Soviet Union can destroy U.S. bombers at
their bases; those that escape this attack will meet Soviet air defenses
later.
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The Soviet war-fighting capability may mean that, given extremely
optimistic assumptions about the survivability of U.S. forces, the
Soviet Union may possess up to 20 per cent more warheads and 40 per
cent more megatonnage than the United States after a first-strike at-
tack. If more pessimistic assumptions about the level of U.S. readi-
ness and survival are considered, the Soviet post-attack advantage can
be as high as 50 and 70 per cent, respectively.
CHAPTER III
DIMENSIONS OF WAR-FIGHTING
Comparisons can be made between U.S. and Soviet conceptions of nu-
clear strategy, but the real issue is their ability to fight, and per-
haps win, a central strategic nuclear war. If there is indeed a vast
difference between these strategies, how is it apparent with respect to
the outcome of a nuclear war? To understand how a nuclear war is waged,
the factors outlined below seem most essential. First, are U.S. ICBMs
vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, and if so, what factors are related
to this condition? Second, how would a nuclear war be waged, and can a
first-strike attack be launched successfully? Third, launch-on-warning
is proposed as an alternative to counter ICBM vulnerability. What is
launch-on-warning and what are its advantages and disadvantages?
Fourth, the throw-weight of an ICBM is perhaps the most important mea-
sure of its war-fighting capability, all things being equal. Thus, how
important is throw-weight and how does it affect calculations of nuclear
stability? Lastly, with respect to SLBMs, strategic bombers, and cruise
missiles, how do they contribute to a nuclear war-fighting capability?
In Chapter HI some answers to these questions are proposed.
ICBM Vulnerabil ity : The Problem Defined
In order to analyze the issue of ICBM vulnerability, it is impor-
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tant to determine when this threat materialized.^'' First, there are
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those who suggest U.S. ICBMs have been vulnerable to a Soviet attack
since 1977 and will remain so until the end of the decade. In order to
support the 1977 date, it was suggested that the Soviet Union had the
capability to destroy 90 per cent of the U.S. ICBM force if it used 300
SS-9, 100 SS-10, and 20 SS-17 or SS-19 ICBMs. This attack force
would comprise a total of 2,623 highly accurate warheads with yields
up to 2 megatons. Therefore, by 1977, on the basis of this capability,
U.S. ICBM vulnerability was assured.
Second, U.S. ICBM viilnerability was predicted by some to begin by
1980-81.^^ For example, the Soviet ability to effectively cripple the
U.S. ICBM force means that the number of surviving ICBMs is low enough
to create severe strategic asymmetry. Thus, it seems that the notion
of Soviet ICBM superiority shifts from the purely theoretical "models"
of the past to highly probable war-fighting scenarios in the present.
The point is that the Soviet Union, as the result of a well-executed
first-strike, can destroy a large percentage of the U.S. ICBM force.
This condition means that the United States is inferior with respect to
the Soviet Union.
Estimates that the Soviet Union can destroy U.S. ICBMs, having
been formulated in the mid to late-1970s, were more optimistic than
recent data might reveal. Between 1977 and 1981 the Soviet Union ex-
panded its ICBM force to create a more lethal threat to the United
States. And while U.S. vulnerability is destabilizing for the United
States, it increases Soviet confidence in its' ability to fight a war.
Indeed, their ability to launch a successful first strike grows more
assured each year. The result is that the United States cannot ride
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out a nuclear attack because it would lose its forces in the process.
Third, the revolution in Soviet war-fighting capabilities means
that the U.S. second-strike strategy is useless because its' forces
cannot survive the first salvo. From a value-maximizing viewpoint, the
Soviet ability to destroy U.S. forces is quite rational. As the Chinese
revolutionary and strategist Sun Tzu notes, the optimal strategy is to
attack the enemy's strategy. Thus, the ability to destroy U.S. iCBMs
not only weakens its second-strike strategy, but makes the Soviet nu-
clear strategy mre effective. The Soviet Union, furthermore, has the
advantage in a crisis because it can act with more indiscretion than the
United States because the latter does not pose a threat to Soviet forces.
Thus, in 1981 U.S. ICBMs are quite probably vulnerable to a Soviet
first-strike attack. However, Soviet ICBMs are not vulnerable to a
U.S. first strike. If the United States is to reverse this it must de-
ploy a large number of hard-target killing forces, that is forces that
can destroy hardened ICBM silos. It is also necessary for the United
States to shift from a second-strike to a first-strike strategy. This
does not create mutual vulnerability or crisis instability, but strength-
ens deterrence because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
can disarm the other.
This revision would deter nuclear war because the incentive to
strike first is decreased if even a small fraction of surving forces
can destroy large numbers of the attacker's forces. The ability to
retaliate in this way deters any rational opponent. It is not the
destruction of cities and towns that deters nuclear war, according to
this strategy, but the destruction of the forces that give a nation the
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ability to fight. For example, it was not the destruction of counter-
value targets in Germany, but the destruction of its armies, that led
to its defeat in World War II. Further, as even the supporters of
strategic countervalue bombing agree, such destruction is not very
effective with respect to defeat, collapse, or systemic decay.
The notion of ICBM vulnerability is rejected by some theorists for
several reasons. First, it is suggested that U.S. ICBMs are not vulnera
ble now nor will be in the future because the calculations on which
vulnerability is based are hypothetical, constructed on narrow techni-
cal and political grounds, and the complexities of a nuclear attack
against ICBM silos are underestimated.^^ Therefore, a first-strike
attack against U.S. ICBMs would effectively disarm the attacker, such
as the Soviet Union, because a very large number of attacking ICBMs is
necessary to destroy even 50 to 60 per cent of an ICBM force. Such a
scenario is divorced from rationality, the point is that this kind of
attack is totally insane.
Second, according to the opponents of ICBM vulnerability, any U.S.
decision to base its deployment of strategic nuclear forces on the
basis of ICBM "vulnerability'' is more "pathological than prudent.
"^^
It is believed that vulnerability is a result primarily of conservative
force planning. In order to meet all conceivable contingencies the
United States prepares its' forces to meet even highly unlikely threats
Thus, it is concluded, ICBM vulnerability is rooted more in strategic
and political perceptions than in reality.
Third, ICBM vulnerability is rejected because the calculations on
which it is based are flawed. The methodology operates as follows.
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If there is a 90 per cent probability that a particular Soviet nuclear
warhead would destroy a hardened U.S. ICBM silo, by extrapolation then
90 per cent of U.S. silos are destroyed if a large enough number of
such warheads are used. Therefore, ICBM vulnerability results from
overly-inflated figures and an exaggeration of the threat. This
methodology is further criticized because "single silo" calculations
of vulnerability differ from aggregate calculations extrapolated to
cover all silos. Given the uncertainties of a nuclear attack, it just
is not accurate to say that a 90 per cent kill probability for one war-
head will destroy 90 per cent of the silos.
There are, however, several flaws in this argument. First, with
respect to the notion of conservative force planning, the cardinal rule
of strategy is that military forces must be configured to meet both
the most likely and most potent threat. Since the threat of a Chinese
counterforce attack against U.S. ICBMs is several orders of magnitude
less than the Soviet threat, the United States is prudent to prepare for
the Soviet contingency. The suggestion that U.S. ICBMs are vulnerable
compel Is it to prepare for such an attack. Since there are uncertainties
about ICBM strikes, it is safer to prepare for the worst.
While there is a tradeoff between planning and capabilities, the
primary measure of war-fighting is the ability to deal with the most
likely threat posed by the most probable adversary. Thus, the United
States prepares its forces to deal with a Soviet counterforce attack
against its ICBMs. This is not to impugn the Soviet character, but to
conclude that the large-yield warheads and highly accurate MIRVs on
Soviet ICBMs are deployed in the configuration that is most effective
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for attacking counterforce targets. By the process of exclusion, U.S.
ICBMs are the most probable targets.
Secona, the question is whether the Soviet Union would build these
forces if it did not think they would be effective against U.S. ICBMs.
Is the United States confident that the Soviet Union cannot destroy
its' ICBMs? If the Soviet Union has overestimated the probability of
destroying US ICBMs, is it not safer with respect to deterrence, for the
United States to counter this Soviet capability? More importantly, the
United States can model its' nuclear forces after depl'oyments by using
their actions as an indicator of Soviet concerns. Even if the Soviet
Union is wrong about U.S. ICBM vulnerability, its actions still suggest
that it assigns a high value to counterforce ICBMs. This model, there-
fore, relates actions, however probabilistically, to values.
Third, not only actual but? perceived capabilities influence U.S.
and Soviet relations. Thus, a perception or even slight suspicion that
the Soviet Union can destroy U.S. ICBMs would severely inhibit U.S.
behavior. The possibility that the Soviet Union can do this can cause
the United States to hesitate in a crisis, even if vital national in-
terests are at stake. For example, if the United States believes the
Soviet Union is superior, even if it is not, it is more likely to sur-
render than fight.
It is reasonable to accept some uncertainty in calculations of
ICBM vulnerability, but given the plethora of conflicting conclusions
about whether the Soviet Union believes U.S. ICBMs are vulnerable, it
is safer to err on the side of caution. Therefore, if ICBM are indeed
vulnerable, what is to be lost if the United States deploys ICBMs that
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can attack Soviet ICBMs? In the end, it may well preserve peace.
ICBM vulnerability can be reduced to a problem of relative vul-
nerability. Thus, the relative Soviet war-fighting capability against
U.S. ICBMs has no intrinsic meaning. This relative "asymmetry," however,
affects directly the political perceptions on which modern international
relations is structured. Therefore, perceptual, if not actual, vulner-
ability is quite dangerous. For example, if the United States is un-
aware that such vulnerability exists, then it may act irrationally with
respect to its actual capabilities.
Further, ICBM vulnerability is not critical because the United
States' SLBM force poses a clear second-strike threat to any attacker.
But, as noted, SLBMs cannot attack counterforce, but only countervalue,
targets. Given overwhelmingly Soviet superiority in total megatonnage
and reserve forces after a first strike, the SLBM is not of much value
if it only induces the Soviet Union to launch a larger and more destruc-
tive countervalue attack.
There is general agreement that U.S. ICBMs are, or will be, vulner-
able in the future, and that remedial action is necessary. The deploy-
ment of highly-accurate ICBMs will deprive all future land-based forces
of the ability to survive a nuclear attack. Their "assured surviva-
bility" in the past is now "assured destruction." If land-based systems
are not secure, is the sea-based medium more reliable and secure? In
other words, can the SLBM replace the ICBM?
Since it is survivable, secure, responsive, and reliable today,
it may be that the SLBM can replace the ICBM. Not only does the SLBM
satisfy the survival requirements of the ICBM, but it saves money and
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is more secure and invulnerable than ICBMs and bombers. But there are
problems with this analysis. First, Soviet and American anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) capabilities are already very threatening and promise to
become more so. For example, in the future, strategic submarines will
be tracked by means of satellites that identify minute traces of hydro-
gen left by the submarine as it separates oxygen and hydrogen from sea
water for its use. Satellites will also measure the slightest change
in surface temperature as the submarine moves under the sea. There-
fore, in the not too distant future, the United States and Soviet
Union probably will know the precise location of each submarine. With
this information, submarines can be destroyed.
Second, the communication link between a submarine and the Nation-
al Command Authorities in the United States is not as secure or reliable
as that for the ICBM. Even peace-time communications with submarines
on patrol are uncertain. Therefore, although the submarine has a high-
readiness rate, its link to the United States may not survive in a nu-
clear war.
Third, SLBMs are not as responsive as ICBMs. This is not related
to the basic physical differences between ICBMs and SLBMs, but to the
basing mode. For example, a mobile deployment system alleviates the
problems associated with fixed systems and gives a force greater survi-
vability and flexibility. Thus, the answer to ICBM vulnerability rests
on its basing system. Several "non-fixed" basing options are presented
as quick-fixes to ICBM vulnerability: rebase the ICBM in multiple
shelters, such as the MX; increase the readiness of the bomber and
submarine forces, and accelerate advanced SLBM and cruise missile
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programs. In the end, however, the solution to ICBM vulnerability in-
volves some form of defense. This is presented in Chapter V.
In the final analysis there are compelling reasons to justify re-
ducing ICBM vulnerability, whether it be real or perceived. The pri-
mary justification for this is political : the cornerstone of U.S.
foreign policy and international security is the ability to restrain
aggressive Soviet actions. Since there is an irreconcilable ideologi-
cal basis to U.S. -Soviet relations, it may be necessary to use force to
achieve security. This is the reality of modern international relations.
Therefore, alleviating ICBM vulnerability is essential to the maintenance
of peace and the avoidance of nuclear war. If the United States ignores
this problem it signals to the Soviet Union that it is unwilling or un-
able to solve it.
Fighting a Nuclear War
The threat to the survival of U.S. ICBMs is neither accidental nor
unintentional, but is caused by the development of Soviet ICBMs speci-
fically configured to destroy ICBMs and hardened installations. This
is asymmetrical, as it is only Soviet forces that threaten U.S. ICBMs,
but not vice versa. When this Soviet capability is coupled to its ex-
tensive investments in civil defense, a first-strike scenario is quite
formidable indeed.
This capability is derived from the large number and high yield of
Soviet warheads. There is simply no other plausible explanation for
the high yield, accuracy and large number of MIRVs on Soviet ICBMs
other than to destroy U.S. hard targets. The benefits that spawn from
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this capability are twofold. First, the Soviet Union can win a nuclear
confrontation because it gives the Soviets the will and power to go as
far "up the ladder of escalation" as the United States, and farther if
necessary. Second, short of its potential in war, this force provides
irrmense political advantages.
If a nation's nuclear strategy is usually consistent with respect
to its appraisal of the most likely threat, probable adversaries, like-
ly areas of confrontation, and preferred modes of engagement, the Soviet
Union is no exception. Its strategic and conventional forces are design-
ed to defeat the enemy by attacking with forces so strong and numerical-
ly superior that the enemy is "shocked" into defeat. For example, the
Soviet ICBM threat is caused primarily by its ability to destroy U.S.
forces quickly, and reduce U.S. retaliation to manageable levels. It
is also clear that if the United States can retaliate against counter-
value targets only, then the Soviet Union may conclude that the United
States will be deterred from further aggression by the threat of more
massive Soviet countervalue attacks.
The characteristics of the Soviet ICBM force that suggest the
ability to launch a first strike are outlined below. The first factor
is the number of ICBM warheads available for use in a counterforce
strike. One SS-19 warhead, for example, can destroy a missile silo with
a probability approaching 90 per cent. This is enough to destroy an
equal percentage of U.S. ICBMs. Second, as the accuracy of Soviet
warheads improves the magnitude of the Soviet ICBM threat increases.
Thus, it is likely that lower CEPs will be coupled with larger numbers
of warheads per ICBM. For example, it is estimated that as of 1981 the
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Soviet Union could destroy all but one dozen U.S. ICBMs. This attack
would be 98 per cent effective.
Although numbers of ICBMs surviving a Soviet first strike vary
according to the source, the U.S. government concludes that a small
fraction of the Soviet ICBM force could, in the early 1980s, reduce
the number of surviving U.S. ICBMs to "low levels. "51 one hundred and
sixty-five SS-13 ICBMs can destroy "virtually all of our 1,000 Minute-
man ICBMs." Although the rationality of this attack can be judged
only on the basis of potential gains, it seems that the Soviet Union
can destroy U.S. ICBMs if it judges the risks to be acceptable at a
given moment.
It is suggested that neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union can successfully destroy a large number of ICBMs in a first strike
due to uncertainty about actual combat performance, the complexities
caused by such factors as fratricide, and the difficulties of coordinat-
ing a large-scale attack for which there is no operational data or
CO
experience.^"^ An important side effect of this attack is collateral
damage to civil lian centers in the form of nuclear fallout. For ex-
ample, a counterforce attack, if it is to be successful, would detonate
megaton-range warheads at or near the surface of the silo in order to
create destructive overpressures. The crushing of the silo occurs be-
cause the fireball, with peripheral temperatures that exceed one million
degrees "K," either vaporizes or severely disfigures the silo cover.
The blast wave then hits the structure with a force conceptually equiva-
lent to that of a hammer striking an object. The resultant pressure
collapses the silo, causing it to fall in and thus bury the ICBM. With
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respect to collateral damage, if the warhead must detonate within 750
feet of the silo to destroy it, and if the diameter of the fireball is
several miles for a one megaton warhead, large amounts of dirt would be
vaporized. In this "ground-burst" explosion large amounts of fallout
will contaminate areas downwind of the explosion. Thus, the average
counterforce attack would produce clouds of fallout that will kill
civilians in collateral areas. Such fallout can be avoided if the at-
tack uses small yield warheads because the resultant fireball is smaller.
The Soviet Union, however, deploys only very large yield warheads, on
the order to 500 kilotons to 24 megatons.
A counterforce attack may escalate to countervalue attacks. If
the Soviet Union produces large amounts of fallout in an attack against
the United States, it would be compelled to retaliate with a counter-
value strike in order to balance U.S. and Soviet collateral casualties.
In effect, the Soviet Union forces the United States to attack Soviet
cities and industries. But would the United States do this? If the
Soviet Union launches a counterforce attack, it must realize that a U.S.
countervalue response is somewhat probable. Given the disparity between
U.S. and Soviet reserve forces and the high yield of Soviet warheads,
however, the incentive against such an attack by the United States is
great. If the Soviet counterforce attack succeeds in destroying U.S.
ICBMs, then remaining U.S. SLBMs, which are ill-suited for counterforce
attacks and weakened by communication problems, can offer only massive
countervalue retaliation. It cannot, however, offer the deliberate
war-fighting capability that war termination would require. Thus,
whether the United States launches a countervalue attack or surrenders
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because a countervalue attack is not acceptable, the Soviet Union wins
the war. This realization can make a counterforce attack more attrac-
tive to the Soviet Union in a crisis.
It is suggested that the Soviet counterforce threat is exaggerated
because the United States, particularly the Department of Defense,
overestimates the accuracy (CEP) of Soviet warheads. For example, the
U.S. Defense Department estimates that the SS-18 warhead has a 64 per
cent probability of destroying an ICBM silo. But this calculation is
uncertain: the actual CEP can be much higher or lower than this. And
if it is much more accurate, then the Soviet ICBM threat is greater than
suggested by even the most pessimistic analyses.
A more questionable assumption is that ICBM vulnerability does not
exist in fact, but in our minds, because we accept a "restricted set
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of assumptions" about Soviet capabilities. However, if the choice is
between overstated and understated Soviet capabilities, the former is
more desirable because it affords more security for the United States.
The deployment of up to 5,000 warheads on Soviet ICBMs alone by the mid-
1980s should dispel remaining doubts about the Soviet "threat. "^^
The size of the Soviet ICBM force, regardless of its war-fighting
capabilities, implies that the Soviet Union is determined to have a
large strategic reserve force after a nuclear exchange. Further, the
Soviet "cold-launch" technique, by which an ICBM is fired from its silo
by a gas generator so that engine ignition does not destroy the silo,
is an indication that the Soviet Union can replace, by "rapid-re load,"
expended ICBMs with its' reserve forces. This suggests that the Soviet
Union has the ability to continue a war beyond the first salvo. The
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United States
,
.however
, does not have either a cold-launch or rapid-
reload capability. Once its ICBMs are fired from its silos, U.S. re-
serve forces are measured by the number of unused ICliMs. Because a
"hot-launched" ICBM destroys its silo and precludes immediate reuse,
the United States has what can be called a "one-shot force."
In order to balance U.S. and Soviet ICbM war-fighting capabilities-,
it is necessary to upgrade the hard-target kill capabilities, the 1,000
U.S. Minuteman ICBMs. This includes increasing the number of MIRVs and
the yield of the warheads to levels that equal those of the Soviet
Union. Given an ICBM war-fighting capability of this magnitude, the
United States could match any Soviet counterforce attack with a counter-
force attack of its' own. At this time, however, the Minuteman III
is inferior to the SS-19 because it carries only three warheads per
ICBM as compared with the eight to ten MIRVs on the SS-19. But if the
United States expands its' ICBM force to include 1,000 Minuteman III,
instead of 550, it would have 3,000 countersilo warheads. A force of
500 MX, instead of the proposed 200, would increase that to 5,000 war-
heads.
If U.S. ICBM and SLBM aggregates are compared with those of the
Soviet Union, at first glance the United States seems to have the ad-
vantage with 9,200 warheads in 1981 in comparison with about 6,000
Soviet warheads. The crucial distinction, however, is that Soviet
warhead yields are larger. Even reducing the CEP and increasing the
yield of the Minuteman III is not sufficient. For example, the U.S.
MK12A warhead increases yield from 170 to 335 kilotons and reduces the
CEP from 0.2 to 0.1 nm. However, until the United States deploys an
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iCBM with at least ten MIRVs per missile, the Soviet IC13M force will
be superior.
The expected response to a war-fighting threat is to improve one's
defenses. For example, in the nuclear age, the hardness of an ICBM silo
can be increased to protect it from the lethal overpressures of a nuclear
blast. Most U.S. ICBM silos are hardened to withstand overpressures up
to 2,000 pounds per square inch (psi), but even this is not sufficient
to reverse the threat posed by Soviet ICBMs. The Soviet Union, however,
is increasing the hardness of its silos to withstand 3,000 psi. This
strategy is effective because the "lethal -kill radius" of U.S. warheads
is less than Soviet warheads, again due to the larger megaton-range
Soviet warheads. Thus, the United States may find that Soviet "time-
critical" targets, that is targets that should be destroyed in the early
phases of the war, are hardened against nuclear attack, and thus more
difficult to destroy.
The most threatening, and topical, war-fighting scenario is the
first-strike attack. It is also the most demanding strike that a nation
can launch. Its aim is to destroy large numbers of adversary ICBMs,
SLBMs, and strategic bombers before nuclear retaliation occurs. For ex-
ample, a first-strike attack launched by the United States would seek
to destroy all Soviet retaliatory systems. A more important definition
of a modern first-strike attack is that it reduces enemy retaliation
to a level that is less than the attacker's reserve forces.
In the past the first-strike attack meant only a strike that suc-
cessfully destroyed all retaliatory forces. Given the second-strike
character of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, neither could disarm the
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other. However, a modern first strike seeks to reduce the attacked
nation's forces to a level so that retaliation only further depletes
whatever reserve forces remain in the attacked nations arsenal. For
example, if further retaliation progressively disarms U.S. forces, then
the Soviet Union would have numerical and operational superiority.
With the first strike amended to reflect modern nuclear war-
fighting capabilities and probable scenarios, the implications of a
successful Soviet first strike are noteworthy. For analytic purposes,
any U.S. first strike is hypothetical and thus unrealistic, for two
reasons. First, the United States cannot launch a disarming first
strike because its ICBM warheads lack the necessary yield and accuracy.
Second, the second-strike character of U.S. strategy precludes, by
definition, a first strike. This strategy "controlled against" the
procurement of first-strike weapons because the United States sought,
ostensibly, only to deter, but not defeat, the Soviet Union in a nuclear
war.
As a first-strike attacker, the Soviet Union is presented with two
options at the outset of the attack: it can launch its entire ICBM
force against the victim, or it can launch "selectively," that is to
launch a limited number of warheads against particular targets over a
longer period of time. As a well prepared first-strike attacker, the
Soviet Union is not compelled to launch its forces all at once, but can
attack selected targets with care. The reason is that the United
States cannot, during a lull in the attack, destroy Soviet ICBMs. Thus,
the Soviet Union can destroy perhaps 90 per cent of the U.S. ICBM force
using about 15 per cent of its force, or about 200 ICBMs. Soviet
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reserve forces would total about 1 ,i^00 ICBMs.
In this situation the United States can either use its' ICBM force
immediately or lose them. For example, if the United States waits
until the Soviet attack is over to see how many of its' ICBMs survive,
then it probably may find that, as noted, 90 per cent are destroyed.
Thus, it is not possible to wait until the attack is over before retal-
iating, as was suggested by MAD. If the United States launches its
ICBMs during the attack, or when information confirms that an attack is
imminent, against what targets does it launch? To hit Soviet cities
would cause the Soviet Union to devastage U.S. cities.^''' To hit Soviet
ICBM silos without knowing which ones are empty simply wastes precious
reserve forces. Therefore, the United States may be compelled to
launch perhaps a few ICBMs to demonstrate a commitment to fighting the
war. This, however, is not adequate to deter nuclear war.
The Soviet first-strike capability is more pronounced than data
from the late 1970s might suggest. For example, if the Soviet Union
continues to deploy SS-19s at the present rate, it will have an even
more powerful first-strike, counterforce capability.
Let us say the United States, despite the prohibitively high cost
in terms of civilian and industrial damage, launches a retaliatory coun-
tervalue attack against the Soviet Union. If U.S. SLBMs (U.S. ICBMs
were destroyed in a Soviet first strike) are targeted against Soviet
cities, it is expected they would kill and injure perhaps 35 to 50 mil-
lion people, and destroy 35 to 50 per cent of the Soviet industrial
capacity. Given that the Soviet Union seeks to protect its population,
it is conceivable that critical segments of the population would survive.
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and that damage to its industrial base could be repaired. By contrast,
a Soviet countervalue attack could kill as many as 150 million Americans.
Since the industrial heartland of the United States is concentrated in
a crescent-shaped area, within easy reach of Soviet SLBMs, U.S. indus-
trial damage could be as high as 75 percent. Is this deterrence?
There are technical difficulties to be overcome in a first-strike
attack. The first and most perplexing problem is that incoming warheads
may interfere with each other. ^8 as one warhead detonates, it can de-
stroy or deflect companion warheads. (This is one reason for collater-
al damage.) Therefore, it is necessary to have incoming ICBM warheads
closely spaced; this does not allow the defender to launch its' ICBMs
through a "window," that is, an interruption in the attack, caused by
poor attack timing. Thus, a properly-executed first-strike attack
launches ICBMs so that the intended targets are attacked from south to
north without any interruption. If the attacked nation attempts to
launch a retaliatory strike in the midst of this, its forces would be
destroyed while being launched or in flight, by attacking nuclear ex-
plosions.
Second, a nuclear explosion produces an intense field of electro-
magnetic radiation, called electromagnetic pulse (EMP), In the vicini-
ty of EMP all electrical and communication processes are disrupted.
Thus, in a "normal" first-strike attack, the U.S. ICBM force could have
its computer targeting memory banks erased by the EMP. Without this
information, it is not possible to target an ICBM. For example, if the
Soviet Union, as a precursor to a first-strike attack against U.S. ICBMs,
detonated a 100 megaton nuclear weapon 100 miles above the United
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States, it is possible that all U.S. coinmuni cations would be disrupted.
(This attack might also create a continental
-wide firestorm.)
Third, the complications related to targeting simultaneously
1,000 ICBM silos exceed U.S. or Soviet capabilities. Therefore, the
destruction of 90 per cent of enemy silos would constitute, say the op-
ponents of this attack, an "improbably favorable break" even if the
attack averaged 5.4 warheads per silo.^^ This datum, however, is obso-
lete and therefore reflects quite pessimistic results because one modern
Soviet ICBM warhead can destroy a silo.
Fourth, a successful first-strike attack is very unlikely to occur
because the potential attacker is deterred by uncertainty about whether
the attacked will launch a massive countervalue retaliation. Therefore,
the probability of a spasm countervalue attack seems quite low because
the human predisposition is to wait and see. Although the United
States might attack a few Soviet countervalue targets to demonstrate
its willingness to fight, it is unlikely to launch until it determines
the extent of damage caused by the Soviet attack. And if it does wait,
its forces would be destroyed. Therefore, the pressure to capitulate
may be almost irresistible.
Launch-on-Warning : An Alternative to Vulnerability
It may be that the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs can be reduced with
a launch-on-warning (LOW) policy. That is, U.S. ICBMs are launched from
their silos before Soviet ICBMs arrive. Further, the Soviet Union can
never assess accurately whether the United States adopts a LOW policy.
Given the 30 minute delay between warning and impact, there would be
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tremendous pressure on the National Command Authority to launch ICBMs
on warning to avoid their destruction.
Since the fixed-site weapon, whether an ICBM or a strategic bomber
at its base, is vulnerable to direct attack, there is mounting pressure
to change its basing. In order to reduce vulnerability, ICBMs can be
deployed on a mobile platform, the silos can be hardened further, or as
a last resort, ICBM can be launched-on-warning. However, dependence on
strategic warning systems for unambiguous confirmation that an attack
is underway is very risky. Consider, for example, the consequences of
an error in detection: U.S. ICBMs could be launched without any real
provocation. The longer the United States waits to confirm that an
attack was launched, the shorter the "window" through which ICBMs can
be fired. Therefore, ICBM vulnerability has multiple effects, includ-
ing a weakening of resolve in a crisis.
A launch-on-warning policy is quite desirable in light of Soviet
superiority. When would the United States use a LOW policy? First, a
Soviet counterforce attack against U.S. ICBMs. Second, as a counter-
value response to Soviet attack in order to balance U.S. and Soviet
countervalue losses. Third, to prevent post-attack Soviet superiority
and the pressure to capitulate. Therefore, the purpose of LOW is to
reduce the vulnerability of US ICBMs. Less vulnerable ICBMs reduce
both crisis instability and restores a balance between U.S. and Soviet
war-fighting capabilities. Until strategic symmetry occurs, with
launch-on-warning, the Soviet Union will be deterred from nuclear war
because the United States can retaliate, thus turning the Soviet Union
into a wasteland. More importantly, however, it deters the Soviet Union
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because of uncertainty about the U.S. strategy.
Launch-on-Warning (LOW) Policy, is not equivalent to a devastating
countervalue weapon. The objective is to deter a Soviet first-strike
attack by suggesting that U.S. counterforce retaliation is ce^ain. If
LOW is aimed to destroy countervalue targets in the Soviet Union, it
only increases crisis instability and induces a Soviet countervalue
reply. It, perhaps, may increase an attacker's uncertainty about the
number of its targets that will survive U.S. attack.
When is launch-on-warning useful? First, it is effective only in
response to a massive Soviet counterforce attack, whereby the United
fii
States launches its' ICBMs in retaliation. Unlaunched Soviet ICBMs
as well as selected counterforce and countervalue targets would be
attacked. Second, it is useful if it redresses a technical break-
through. However, it still should be of the "we do not rule it out"
category. For example, the United States has issued veiled threats
that it may use LOW because it wants to induce a large measure of un-
certainty into Soviet attack plans. But launch-on-warning depends on
the ability of the United States to determine that the Soviet Union
has indeed attacked, to assess the size of the attack, and to deter-
mine if it is the most appropriate response. It is conceivable that
by the time the first two steps are completed, U.S. ICBMs would al-
ready be destroyed. If the Soviet Union deploys a sophisticated
MARVed SLBM, for example, warning time would be so compressed that the
United States could not alert its bases, let alone launch its ICBMs,
SLBM, and bombers.
It may be an exaggeration to say launch-on-warning is th£ answer
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to ICBM vulnerability because it demonstrates to the Soviet Union that
the comparatively small gains of a first-strike attack against U.S.
ICBMs only causes automatic U.S. retaliation. A certain response de-
ters the Soviet Union because net Soviet gains from a first-strike
attack would be small. But if deterrence rests on fear of defeat but
not destruction, then more importantly, even the possibility of launch-
on-warning would deter Soviet aggression. The following historical
parallel is instructive. The Soviet Union apparently was prepared to
use launch-on-warning in the late 1960s, when it thought it was in-
ferior.
In sum, launch-on-warning reduces ICBM vulnerability, increases
Soviet attack uncertainties, and reduces losses of nuclear forces.
Therefore, the purpose of LOW is not actually to reduce the number
of destroyed ICBMs, but to deter the Soviet Union from nuclear attack
with the knowledge that retaliation against its nuclear war-fighting
forces will be swift, certain, and decisive.
A slight deviation from launch-on-warning is launch-under-attack
(LUA). For example, the United States could launch its ICBMs only
after the first Soviet ICBM warheads had hit their targets. However,
the chaotic results of an attack against ICBMs can raise so much
dust, dirt, and debris that U.S. ICBMs could not be launched. To
counter this, the United States has improved the ability of its ICBMs
to withstand the effects of a post-nuclear attack environment. Further,
launch-under-attack may not be possible because a well-executed Soviet
attack would not leave "windows" through which ICBMs could be fired.
If it is designee to avoid the massive response of LOW, what happens
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if the Soviet Union launches only a few ICBMs? Does this require a re-
duced launch-under-attack response? Since the Soviet Union is very un-
likely to launch only a few ICBMs. given the attendant risks of U.S.
misinterpretation, the United States may not have to answer this
question.
It is important to note that launch-on-warning and launch-under-
attack can reduce the reserve force of the attacker. For example, if
some U.S. forces are destroyed by a Soviet first strike, with LOW/LUA
would the United States attack empty Soviet silos? If so, then U.S.
reserve forces would be wasted in the process. Thus, this strategy
cannot produce a significant gain for the attacked nation, and thus is
analogous to MAD with respect to massive retaliation. Therefore,
launch-on-warning and launch-under-attack do not reduce actual vulner-
ability but only assure that the attacked nation will respond. This
can, as noted, only contribute to reserve force depletion.
There are five compelling arguments against launch-on-warning and
launch-under-attack. First, if Soviet ICBM superiority increases the
pressure on the United States to attack first in a crisis in order to
avoid losing its forces, then LOW/lUA increases uncertainty about
whether the United States can launch with discrimination during a nu-
clear war. There is no indication that these responses would be con-
trolled, effective, or even necessary. Second, there is a self-
compelling bureaucratic logic to launch-on-warning and launch-under-
attack.^^ Once an adversary is convinced that the enemy may launch its
forces on warning, the incentive to successfully destroy such forces in
a preemptive attack increases significantly. If these forces are not
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destroyed, they will be used to retaliate against the attacker. Failure
to launch-on-warning or under attack means that the attacked nation's
forces can be destroyed subsequently.
Third, strategic warning systems become the most critical target
in a nuclear war. If these are crippled, a nation cannot respond ef-
fectively because there is no knowledge about the attack. Again, the
pressures to preemptively destroy strategic warning systems may be
irresistible.
Fourth, launch-on-warning and launch-under-attack can create de-
pendence on "hair trigger" response mechanisms. Although these tactics
are cheaper than building a new ICBM, for example, they still tend to
be dangerous. Even if the United States can destroy significant numbers
of Soviet targets with its surviving forces it is dangerous to think
in terms of LOW and LUA. In a crisis, the pressure to think in terms
of revenge, anger, and punishment may be too great to resist. And if
the United States adopts these tactics, it forfeits a measure of con-
trol in a nuclear war to the Soviet Union.
Fifth, launch-on-warning can bo called "reckless" because it re-
sults in post-attack advantage to the Soviet Union, if tne Soviet Union
uses 20 per cent of its forces to destroy 70 per cent of U.S. forces,
launch-on-warning only further disarms the United States. It is, there-
fore, self-defeating and suicidal.
Even veiled suggestions by the United States that it favors launch-
on-warning or launch-under-attack indicates that it faces a severe
threat to the survival of its forces. It may also mean that the United
States lacks more desirable options. Further, given the possibility of
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accident, the tendency toward instability, the vulnerability of strate-
gic warning systems, the lack of time in a crisis to make momentous
decisions, and the disarming nature of LOW, it is inherently danger-
ous. It should never become the cornerstone of U.S. nuclear strategy.
ICBM Throw-Weight
From the war-fighting perspective, the throw-weight of an ICBM
defines the total payload in pounds that is carried to the target. It
is commonplace to assign an aggregate throw-weight, in the millions
of pounds, to an ICBM force for the purposes of comparison. Until the
development of MIRVs, the United States and Soviet Union followed two
divergent, yet characteristic, paths. The United States deployed ICBMs
with substantially less throw-weight because its warheads were more
accurate than Soviet warheads. It could destroy a target with a lower
yield warhead because the warhead would land closer to the target. The
Soviet Union, however, constructed ICBMs with very large throw-weight
because its' CEPs were much higher.
This asymmetry between U.S. and Soviet ICBM throw-weights seemed
unimportant until the Soviet Union placed large numbers of MIRVs on
its ICBMs. It can place up to 10 high yield warheads on its SS-18, for
example. By contrast, the United States is limited to 3 MIRVs on its'
most modern ICBM, the Minuteman III. In the context of a war-fighting
strategy, with its throw-weight Soviet ICBMs can destroy up to 10
U.S. ICBMs. for each Soviet missile fired. In the past, however, this
throw-weight on Soviet ICBMs was reserved for attacking U.S. cities and
industries.
81
The essential relationship between a war-fighting capability and
throw-weight is that larger throw-weight increases the number of tar-
gets that an ICBM can attack. Thus, a larger throw-weight means that
a larger number of MIRVs is possible on a given missile. In terms of
a nuclear attack, for example, 2,000 pounds of throw-weight can destroy
a silo with 95 per cent confidence; 3,500 pounds can destroy aircraft
in flight in a 400 square mile area; and 15,000 pounds can destroy sub-
marines within a 300 square mile area. If the Soviet Union seeks to
destroy 1,200 ICBM silos, cover 400,000 square miles of aircraft escape
zones, and attack 100 submarine aim points, how much throw-weight is
required? The first option requires 2.4 million pounds, the second 3
million pounds, and the third 1.5 million pounds. The Soviet Union can
attack these targets and still retain 50 per cent of its strategic nu-
clear throw-weight.^^ Therefore, the aggregate Soviet nuclear throw-
weight is 14 million pounds . In terms of comparative war-fighting capa-
bilities, the Soviet ICBM force has 5.9 million pounds of throw-weight,
the U.S. ICBM force, 1.1 million pounds. Therefore, Soviet ICBM
throw-weight is 5.4 times larger than the United States. Of the total
throw-weight available to the United States and Soviet Union, some 7
million pounds on their ICBMs, the Soviet Union has 85 per cent, the
United States 15 per cent.
Therefore, the Soviet Union is with respect to gross throw-weight,
far superior to the United States. In operational terms the Soviet ad-
vantage is even more staggering. For example, if 200 SS-18 ICBMs are
used to destroy U.S. ICBMs, the U.S. war-fighting capability would be
destroyed, while the Soviet war-fighting capability would be intact.
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This would use 56 per cent of the aggregate Soviet throw-weight and 14
per cent of its ICBM force. If the Soviet Union expanded this attack
to include bombers and submarines, the vast majority of U.S. war-fight-
ing capabilities would be destroyed. However, the Soviet Union would
still retain over 7 million pounds of throw-weight in its bomber and
SLBM forces for use against U.S. countervalue targets.
When the debate about the threat posed by Soviet ICBM throw-weight
surfaced in the 1970s, it was assumed that U.S. superiority in other
technological indices would balance the Soviet throw-weight advantage.
In 1981, however, this is no longer true. Further, the argument that
Soviet throw-weight was not intrinsically threatening seemed appealing
because it weakened the position that the Soviet Union was gaining
strategic superiority. It appears that the United States was surprised
by the magnitude of Soviet throw-weight. Thus, in 1980 the United
States revised its estimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities ahead by five
years in order to more accurately reflect the threat. One prescient
analyst noted in 1977 that when the Soviet Union matches U.S. MIRV
technology, which it has, the disparity between U.S. and Soviet throw-
weight will translate into Soviet superiority.
The technology of an ICBM is more important than its throw-weight
but a combination of the two amplifies any potential war-fighting capa-
bility. To assume that throw-weight is not an "accurate ... or meaning-
ful measure of strategic force capability" is evidence of a failure to
understand the connection between ICBM throw-weight and MIRVs.^^ While
this assessment was misleading in 1976, in 1981 it is preposterous.
Therefore, throw-weight is one of the most significant measures of a
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wur-f ighting capability.
It is thus appropriate for the United States to redress the im-
balance in war-fighting capabilities created, albeit partially, by
the throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs. It should make every effort to
threaten Soviet silos with the destruction that attends the large num-
ber of MIRVs on Soviet ICBMs.
The War-Fighting Capabilities of SLBMs
The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force of the early
1970s was the core of the United States nuclear deterrent in terms of
survivability. The 1980s, however, will threaten its war-fighting ef-
fectiveness. Invulnerable today to direct Soviet attack,^^ SLBMs can
retaliate against Soviet countervalue targets. However, as a remnant
of MAD, the SLBM may be threatened by advances in Soviet anti-submarine
warfare (ASW).
The strength of the SLBM is its ability to threaten retaliation in
response to a first-strike attack against the United States. Thus, the
SLBM force could destroy the Soviet Union and thus deter nuclear war.
It also deters the Soviet Union from counterforce attacks, which are
seen to be irrational, because U.S. retaliation is certain. Thus, with
respect to a war-fighting strategy, the fundaniental question is whether
SLBMs can destroy sufficient numbers of Soviet counterforce and counter-
value targets in the 1980s to either deter war, or win one if it occurs?
If the Soviet Union can destroy U.S. ICBMs, for example, there is one
option for the SLBM: a massive countervalue attack. But is this a
rational optionY
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First, the SLBM cannot attack counterforce targets because the
yield of its warhead is too small and its CEP too high.^^ Thus, the
SLBM force is useless in a counterforce attack. Second, the ability
to attack countervalue targets would not deter the Soviet Union because,
as noted, it has overwhelming superiority in countervalue capabilities.
Therefore, the primary shortcoming of the SLBM is that it cannot attack
"time-critical" targets with any degree of confidence. Third, problems
with command, control, and communication raise doubts about its relia-
bility in nuclear war. Further, Soviet ASW (Anti -Submarine Warfare)
capabilities raise questions about its value as the primary retaliatory
force if ICBMs are destroyed. It may be that the United States could
not communicate with its submarines to order an attack. For this
reason, U.S. submarine commanders have independent launch control so
that SLBM retaliation can occur if contact with the United States is
lost. But even this autonomy does not change the injunction against
attack.
Fourth, it is uncertain whether an SLBM attack can destroy Soviet
targets at a level required for deterrence. For example, if the Soviet
Union can protect its industrial facilities from nuclear attack, the
low yield of U.S. SLBM warheads means that countervalue destruction is
not assured. With a 40 kiloton yield on the Poseidon SLBM, it would
damage, but not destroy, Soviet cities and industries. The Soviet poli-
tical, economic, and populational infrastructure may survive.
Fifth, an SLBM second-strike suggests to the Soviet Union that the
United States will attack countervalue targets. Can the Soviet Union
believe the United States would launch a countervalue attack if it
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induces a similar yet more destructive, Soviet response?
In summary, the U.S. SLBM force is not capable of flexible response
options, but only spasm countervalue attacks. Even if a Soviet coun-
tervalue response is not as catastrophic as some models may imply, it
would be more destructive than an^ conceivable U.S. attack. Therefore,
the essential theme of nuclear war is relative destruction.
Strategic Bomber :
An Assessment of Its ' War-Fighting Capability
The war-fighting capability of the strategic bomber is limited be-
cause it is not capable of effective counterforce attacks. Therefore,
the bomber is a second-strike weapon, partially as a result of its
slow speed to the target. However, the bomber does increase the ability
of the United States to fight protracted nuclear wars.
It is not desirable to retaliate with ICBMs and SLBMs alone in a
nuclear war because the bomber offers more control and selectivity;
this applies only between the time the bomber is launched and reaches
its target. Thus, the bomber increases strategic stability because it
is not a first-strike weapon, but is flexible and recalleable.''^ Its'
value is not that it can be brought to the "brink" of nuclear war, as
in an alert, but that it can be used to destroy targets in the Soviet
Union long after Soviet air defenses are depleted or destroyed. This .
can be as long as 6 months after the initial exchange.
Further, since the countervalue mission is not credible as an
instrument of U.S. policy, the bomber can increase U.S. protracted
nuclear war-fighting capabilities. The Soviet Union can never be sure
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whether U.S. bombers are destroyed, or in service, or whether its coun-
terforce weapons will be destroyed.
The bomber complicates the first-strike plans of the Soviet Union
because it is survivable and capable of rapid response. However, it
is quite uncertain whether the present generation of bombers can even
reach their targets. The Soviet Union can easily destroy, with its air
defense systems, those bombers that survive the first attack on the
United States. Therefore, perhaps up to 80 per cent of U.S. bombers
would not survive a first strike to attack the Soviet Union.
The bomber also complicates the timing of a Soviet first strike.
For example, since the warning time between launch and impact for an
ICBM is 30 minutes and 5 to 10 minutes for an SLBM, the bomber can be
launched (if it has time) before the first wave of ICBMs and SLBMs
arrive. An attack against ICBMs alerts the bomber. It may be destroyed,
thus signalling it to take-off. And an attack against the bomber indi-
cates that the ICBM may be threatened. Thus the bomber is secure.
However, this scenario is somewhat misleading. First, the bomber
can be destroyed by "depressed-trajectory" SLBMs. This attack would
not give the bomber time to escape from its bases. Second, if the ICBM
can be destroyed in a first strike, the bomber is even easier to de-
stroy because it is not hardened or otherwise protected against nuclear
blast. Lastly, even if the bomber escapes from its bases, it can be
destroyed in flight by attacking nuclear warheads.
Let us say that the bomber survives a Soviet first strike.
Against what targets should it be used? It cannot attack Soviet coun-
terforce targets, such as ICBM silos, because its long flight time
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gives the Soviet Union ample time to alert its air defenses so that
the bomber could never get near enough to a silo to destroy it. Fur-
ther, if the bomber attacks Soviet cities, then the same problems are
raised with respect to Soviet countervalue superiority.
In sum, even if the bomber is deployed in a flexible and survi-
vable mode (see the conclusion), it has only marginal war-fighting capa-
bilities. Therefore, the strategic bomber can be advantageous only if
it is used in a protracted nuclear war in which it can be launched
many weeks or months after the war starts to inhibit, or at least
slow, Soviet recovery.
Strategic Cruise Missiles : A War-Fighting Potential
It may be that the cruise missile offers a radically different ap-
proach to nuclear war-fighting. Not only is it radically new, but it
will replace all other systems because of its accuracy, cheap cost, and
easy deployment. The cruise missile, however, will not revolutionize
nuclear war-fighting because it lacks the speed and surprise offered
by an ICBM. Thus, the cruise missile is not a first-strike weapon,
and is not expected to be in the near future. Why?
First, the long flight time of the cruise missile and its vulnera-
72
bility to air defense attrition precludes a first-strike attack.
Like the bomber, the cruise missile requires 6 to 10 hours to reach
its target if that target is in the Soviet heartland. Today, however,
the cruise missile does not have intercontinental range, but is limited
to ranges of 2,500 kilometers or less. It is likely that the Soviet
Union could detect its presence quite early in flight, and take proper
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measures to intercept and destroy it.
Second, the present and foreseeable characteristics of the cruise
missile indicate that it is extremely vulnerable to preemptive strike,
especially if it were deployed on a strategic bomber that could be
attacked by Soviet SLBMs in a first-strike. For example, if cruise
missiles are deployed on a strategic bomber or a standoff cruise mis-
sile carrier, each carrier would become a high priority target for So-
viet air defenses. If one such carrier were destroyed, as many as 100
cruise missiles would perish. Thus, successful attacks against cruise
missile concentrations can deplete a force of cruise missiles very
quickly.
Third, a cruise missile has no defense, at this time, against
Soviet air defense missiles and radars. Each cruise missile could be
identified by Soviet Air-borne Warning and Control (AWACs) aircraft and
intercepted by the appropriate weapon, whether it be a fighter or a
surface-to-air missile. In the future it is likely that cruise missiles
will be equipped with electronic countermeasures so that Soviet de-
fenses will be confused, and thus defeated.
If it is accepted that th cruise missile is essentially a second-
strike weapon for use in protracted nulcear wars, then it can offer
substantial benefits to the United States. The cruise missile can be
a very effective second, third, or fourth strike weapon. In particular,
after a first strike by the Soviet Union, the cruise missile can be used
to overwhelm the Soviet Union by virtue of sheer numbers. For example,
if the United States deployed 100 cruise missiles on a number of bombers
equal to present deployments (316), then the Soviet Union would have to
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contend with 31,500 cruise missiles. The United States could launch
waves of cruise missiles totalling 10,000 missiles each. How would
the Soviet Union destroy such an attack? In all probability, it could
not. Thus, the cruise missile can be a very effective saturation
weapon if it is deployed in very large numbers.
The cruise missile, if it is deployed in this type of attack sys-
tem, would deter nuclear first strikes because the enemy could never
defeat such retaliation. Thus, the probability of destruction is so
high that an enemy would be insane to launch a first strike. Further,
cruise missiles ensure that retaliation could consist of multiple waves,
with each wave containing thousands of missiles.
The cruise missile can be used to destroy Soviet ICbM silos, but
not in a disarming first strike. For example, suppose the Soviet Union
launched a first strike against the United States with its ICBMs. If
the United States is concerned about the Soviet ability to reload its
silos, cruise missiles, with non-nuclear warheads, could destroy empty
silos so that reloading is not possible. Further, cruise missiles could
attack known Soviet ICBM storage sites, thereby depleting such forces
before they can be used.
Can the cruise missile balance U.S. and Soviet war-fighting forces
and, therefore, reverse the present Soviet advantage? This is not like-
ly given that ICBMs are essentially first-strike weapons, while the
cruise missile is a second-strike force. For example, the Soviet ad-
vantage in nuclear throw-weight could not be balanced by cruise missiles
unless it were deployed in extremely large numbers, say 100,000 or more.
And this would have no measurable strategic purpose.
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Further, would the cruise missile force the Soviet Union to adopt
a launch-on-warning policy in order to protect its ICBMs? This is not
likely because a cruise missile attack against the Soviet Union would
give several hours warning. During this time, the Soviet Union could
alert its air defenses and launch its ICBMs in a first strike against
the United States. Thus, the Soviet Union could wait out the attack
to determine its extent and probable targets. There is no sense to a
first-strike attack with cruise missi les
. if the enemy has several hours
to contemplate retaliation. A cruise missile is not a first-strike
weapon.
If the United States could retarget cruise missiles while in
flight, then its' war-fighting effectiveness would be enhanced. For
example, if the United States established a direct data link between
surveillance satellites and attacking cruise missiles, the cruise mis-
siles could be directed to Soviet silos that still contain ICBMs. This
would allow the United States to fine tune, as it were, its attack to
fit the precise characteristics of the Soviet deployment.
The cruise missile may be an effective weapon if it forces the
Soviet Union to spend lavish sums on its air defenses. Otherwise, such
resources would be spent to upgrade Soviet ICBMs.
The most serious fault with the cruise missile, with respect to
nuclear war-fighting, is that a small number of attacking cruise mis-
siles can be destroyed by the Soviet Union. Thus, to ensure that the
cruise missile reaches its target, it is necessary to launch thousands
in order to saturate Soviet defenses.
The war-fighting effectiveness of the cruise missile would be
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improved if it were equipped with electronic countermeasures , and were
capable of 4,000 to 6,000 km ranges. If it is deployed in large numbers
and designed expressly for protracted nuclear wars, the cruise missile
can be a very threatening weapon. It will not, however, radically
change nuclear war-fighting.
CHAPTER IV
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
AND CIVIL DEFENSE
A Definition of Limited Nuclear War
With the advent of a nuclear war-fighting strategy, it is inevit-
able that the possibility of limited nuclear war would arise.^'^ First,
since counterforce nuclear weapons allow a nation to destroy military
and non-military targets, such destruction in the beginning of the war
could signal to the United States and Soviet Union that the war may
involve intolerable losses. This could cause the war to be terminated
after a limited nuclear exchange: that is, destruction that is less
that a total nuclear war. Second, given the accuracy of modern nuclear
warheads, civilian destruction and collateral damage can be avoided
if the war is limited. This means that a limited nuclear war does not
stress countervalue destruction. The possibility that command centers
will be destroyed, however, always exists; even then it is unlikely
that the war would be total.
The central principle of limited nuclear war-fighting is that, if
the war does begin, only targets whose destruction serves a political
purpose are attacked. Specifically, the destruction of targets that
weaken the opponent's war-fighting capability is essential. Thus, in
a limited nuclear war a nation could launch ICBMs against military
targets, but avoid: the destruction of countervalue targets. Nuclear
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war, therefore, can remain limited when it is determined that further
destruction, whether countervalue or counterforce, is not worth risking
reprisal, and when a nation cannot benefit from further attacks.
Given what is known about U.S. and Soviet strategic reserve
forces, it is conceivable that the United States can be deterred from
nuclear attacks because the Soviet Union, with its reserves, threatens
to destroy more civilian targets than the United States. Therefore,
the United States would be advised to avoid all actions that might be
construed by the Soviet Union as countervalue destruction. This is
particularly important if the United States considers attacking a tar-
get at the periphery of a city. If the Soviet Union has a larger num-
ber of more capable war-fighting nuclear forces, then the United States
would probably refrain from fighting. It is plausible, and indeed
quite probable, that the United States would stop, either through capi-
tulation or simple acquiesence, the war after a limited nuclear exchange.
If the circumstances were reversed, the Soviet Union would probably do
the same.
Thus, with a strategy for fighting a limited nuclear war, a nation
would halt the war immediately as soon as it realized that destruction
exceeds possible gains. In order to deny this proposition, it is neces-
sary to argue that the United States and Soviet Union do not understand
the nature of "meaningful" destruction in a nuclear war, or that once
a nuclear war begins, that it cannot be terminated until all U.S. and
Soviet forces are depleted. If, however, they do understand it, then
they will use all means at their disposal to prevent unnecessary
destruction and perhaps avoid escalation to nuclear war altogether.
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With strategic superiority, however, a threshold is imposed (psychologi-
cally) on the inferior nation: it would hesitate to fight because it
cannot inflict an equal level of damage as the superior nation. The
size of the nuclear reserve forces is a factor in determining this
threshold. If the U.S. and Soviet Union understand the meaning of
destruction, and if they are rational opponents, it is entirely plausi-
ble that a nuclear war will remain under strict political control.
There is concern that nuclear war could escalate "automatically"
without U.S. or Soviet approval to an unlimited, spasm war. In order
to support this notion there must be agreement either that the nuclear
apparatus mesmerizes its participants, or that nuclear war is subject
to unknown and otherwise mysterious forces. Since the notion of con-
trol is so important to a theory of limited nuclear war. the destruc-
tion of command centers is illustrative. For example, the traditional
injunction against targeting command centers was based on the notion
that this would keep the war under control. The objection to this
argument is that, the nature of war aside, a nation does not fight a
nuclear war without being able to control its actions. According to
the theory of limited nuclear war, however, war will be avoided if a
nation is aware that its command centers, its "heart and mind," will
be destroyed. Therefore, the ability to destroy such targets is in
the national interest because a controlled nuclear war is more deadly
than a "spastic" or uncoordinated one. The point is that a nation
should protect its command bunkers during a war.
Limited nuclear war is likely to transform into a total nuclear
war because it is impossible for a nation to assess the number, yield,
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and resultant destruction caused by a nuclear attack.^^ If such in-
formation is not available, total retaliation may be the only option.
The assumption, in this case, is that a nation only seeks to inflict
an equal level of destruction of the attacker as the attacker caused.
The presumption is that, if an attacker is aware of this, it will be
deterred from war. In a theory of limited nuclear war, however, the
notion of reciprocal destruction is rejected.
Further, a total nuclear response is unlikely because there would
be great pressure to wait until the size of the attack was determined.
Hesitation, that is the duration between attack and retaliation, is
dependent on the size of the attacker's reserve forces. The larger the
reserve force, the less likely retaliation.
In response to a Soviet counterforce first strike against U.S.
ICBMs, i:he United States could retaliate against Soviet ICBMs.
From the Soviet Union's perspective, this response may well be the
most threatening because it means that its nuclear war-fighting forces
will be destroyed. The next most threatening response is to attack
Soviet command centers in order to disrupt the Soviet decision-making
complexes that will eventually direct recovery. If it is assumed that
a nation is rational and that it would execute a nuclear attack in a
predictable and measured way, then limited nuclear war is possible.
The most important factor in a theory of limited nuclear war is that
war will cease when the price of further action becomes just too great
to bear.
The implication of a strategy of limited nuclear war is that
nuclear war is not necessarily irrational, and that once it begins it
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can be limited for political purposes. For example, the United
States could launch a massive attack in response to a Soviet coun-
tertorce attack. However, it is more likely to limit its' response
to essential elements of the Soviet war machine. Since its' reserve
forces are smaller than the Soviet Union's, the United States would
avoid compelling the Soviet Union to attack U.S. countervalue targets.
But if the United States does attack Soviet counterforce targets, it
will soon deplete its nuclear arsenal. Thus, with a theory of limited
nuclear war the United States is absolved from this dilemma: it can
attack a small number of Soviet targets, under the pretext of fighting
a limited nuclear war, and still retain political credibility. The
only other option is to attack Soviet countervalue targets en masse .
This is not advised.
In this study it is emphasized that counterforce options, under
the rubric of a war-fighting and first-strike strategy, are more credi-
ble than countervalue attacks. Therefore, the question with respect
to limited nuclear war, is whether countervalue attacks can be useful.
If the United States could, for example, demoralize the Soviet Union
with a countervalue attack against Moscow, and thus end the war, then
countervalue attack would be useful. However, it is very probable
that this would force the Soviet Union to destroy Washington, D.C. in
retaliation. Would the war end at that point? Even if the United
States, after this attack, retains the ability to fight a limited nu-
clear war, would the destruction of its' capital be sufficient cause
to end the war? Given that the Soviet Union still has superiority in
the countervalue realm, the probability is that the war would expand
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to include other cities in the United States. Again, the United States
is in the position of the inferior nation after a counterforce attack.
Thus, it would not continue to fight. The paradox is that the United
States must launch some retaliation after a Soviet nuclear attack
to retain some credibility.
In its simplest form, the ability to fight a limited nuclear war
to a successful conclusion means that the attacked nation can always
retaliate against targets of its choice, that is not being confined
to attacks against targets that force the enemy to expand the war.
Thus, symmetrical capabilities for fighting a limited nuclear war is
the same as the ability to fight a counterforce war. In each case,
balanced nuclear capabilities dissuade war and thus preserve peace.
It is correct that plans for fighting a limited nuclear war are
based on abstract calculations about probable actions in a very uncer-
tain environment. If the United States neglects to analyze the prob-
able course of events in a limited nuclear war on the grounds that the
level of uncertainty is too high for accurate planning, then whatever
action it does take may be irrational and simply ineffective. There-
fore, in order to avoid or at least minimize uncertainty, it is neces-
sary to calculate the most likely (and threatening) Soviet attack, and
the most effective U.S. response. Since uncertainty attends all cal-
culations about future events, and that it increases the farther into
the future one proceeds, all nuclear wars are somewhat uncertain with
respect to outcome. This uncertainty, however, does not free the
United States from the responsibility of planning to fight and win a
war.
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Does a democratic political system, such as the United States,
face special problems with respect to the exercise of authority in a
nuclear war? As a democratic system in which decisions are made with
tacit pMblic approval, the United States may be pressured by public
opinion to retaliate after a Soviet nuclear attack in order to balance
U.S. and Soviet civilian losses. However, the high level of chaos
associated with a nuclear war precludes, by necessity, any coherent,
organized, and articulate expression of public will. As such, the
National Command Authority would have virtually unlimited political
power. Thus, the concept of democratically-controlled behavior is
meaningless after a nuclear exchange. In a narrow sense, however, the
lack of a well-defined public "will" during a nuclear war can be bene-
ficial: it is critical that the United States does not allow public
expectations about the execution of a nuclear war to contaminate the
exigencies of the moment.
An Analysis of Civil Defense
It is essential to protect the civilian population during a nu-
clear war if there is to be any hope of survival. Therefore, as a
tactic of a nuclear war-fighting strategy, civil defense is examined
so that it can be defined and its effectiveness in a large-scale nu-
clear war assessed.
A Soviet counterforce attack against the U.S. ICBM fields could
cause between 10 and 16 million civilian casualties downwind of the
attack. Losses of this magnitude are entirely conceivable if a popu-
lation is not protected by some type of civil defense, whether by
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evacuation or sheltering. Thus, civil defense is a corollary of a
nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy. If the United States
and the Soviet Union want to keep civilian casualties within limits
that make recovery possible, the object is to protect those popula-
tions that will drive the recovery machine. Without a skilled popu-
lation, recovery is not possible. Further, the length of time required
for political, economic, and social recovery depends directly on the
size and technical skills of the surviving population.
Since a nuclear attack against U.S. ICBMs can destroy some civil-
ian sectors, such as St. Louis which is immediately downwind of the
Whitman Air Force Minuteman fields, civil defense can protect such
populations from devastation. As one study notes, civil defense can
"have a great lifesaving potential in the event of a nuclear attack
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against specific military targets." Thus, even a limited counter-
force nuclear war would kill some civilians, but this could be limited
to unprotected people.
It is essential to distinguish between civil defense and all
damage limitation: it is not possible, with respect to the former,
to protect a population from an attack that seeks to kill people. Un-
less the United States would be willing to construct "escape portals"
in all major cities to transport millions of people as rapidly as
possible to underground protection stations, it is not feasible, given
modern technology, to shelter people from the effects of proximate
nuclear explosions. Aside from the astronomical cost, the displace-
ment of millions of people to protected areas and the provision of
adequate supplies of food, water, and air would involve a scale of
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planning heretofore unimagined in the United States or anywhere in
the world.
Consider a Soviet counterforce attack against U.S. ICBMs that
killed or injured between 10 and 16 million Americans. Some would die
because a nuclear warhead detonated over a city rather than striking
its assigned target. Most, however, would perish from the effects
of radioactive fallout, inadequate food and shelter, the lack of medi-
cal care, and the general confusion that would deprive people of basic
necessities. Although there would be tremendous psychological stress
on the surviving population, even this may not preclude long-term
survival. The Japanese in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that survived the
nuclear attack exemplify the ability to adapt to and cope with severe
stress.
Since U.S. ICBMs are deployed in nine bases, a Soviet counter-
force attack, using thousands of nuclear warheads, could cause signi-
ficant amounts of fallout downwind of the attack. Since prevailing
winds in the United States travel from west to east, areas east of
an attack would receive varying amounts of radiation depending on its
distance from the explosion. Such fallout results primarily from
"ground-burst" nuclear explosions. In order to assure that a warhead
will destroy a hardened nuclear ICBM silo, the warhead must explode
within 750 feet of the silo for overpressure, heat, blast, and electro-
magnetic pulse (ElMP) to destroy it. The larger the yield of the nuclear
warhead, the larger the diameter of the nuclear fireball, and the
larger the amount of dirt that is vaporized when the fireball touches
the earth. It is this dirt that becomes the radioactive fallout.
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Since the Soviet Union's ICBM force has very high yield warheads, a
counterforce attack would create large amounts of fallout. By compari-
son, the smaller yield on U.S. ICBM warheads is an indication that a
U.S. counterforce attack against Soviet ICBMs would not produce near-
ly as much fallout.
In order to destroy the 1,000 U.S. ICBM silos, the Soviet Union
would have to use between 1,000 and 2,000 ground-burst nuclear explo-
sions. There are two immediate effects. First, the U.S. ICBM force
would be destroyed. Second, and more importantly with respect to
civil defense, there would be several million casualties in the im-
mediate vicinity of the attack. This Soviet attack would have iirinense
strategic value because the United States would be disarmed of its most
capable nuclear weapon, and would face severe physical and psychologi-
cal dislocation in the affected populations. There is an indication
that this may cause "autohyponotism" in the United States; that is,
the United States would be paralyzed by the attack and would not retal-
iate.
Further, the issue is whether the United States would retaliate
against the Soviet Union in order to balance U.S. and Soviet casualties.
If there are millions of injured Americans, the United States may have
no choice but to retaliate. But to do so could induce the Soviet
Union to retaliate against U.S. countervalue targets. The possibility
for escalation is obvious.
It is essential to note that nuclear war can create millions of
civilian casualties; civil defense, however, can reduce such casualties
to levels that are manageable. In a counterforce nuclear war, this is
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particularly important because it reduces the pressure to counterattack
against the attacker's cities and industries. Further, the signifi-
cance of a nuclear attack, whether counterforce or countervalue, is
measured by the number of casualties that result. This is a variant
of MAD when deterrence was measured by the ability to destroy civilians
in retaliation. Deterrence now, however, is a function of the ability
to disarm the adversary.
It is often suggested by the opponents of civil defense that it
can be a serious policy option only if it allows the United States to
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protect virtually 100 per cent of its people. This criterion is not
in accordance with crisis stability and deterrence, at least in terms
of a war-fighting strategy. In reality, however, the purpose of civil
defense is to protect as many civilians as possible from the effects
of a nuclear war. If 60 to 70 per cent of the U.S. population survives
a nuclear war, then recovery is quite feasible. With only 40 per cent
surviving, recovery is less likely and will take more time.
There is an explicit relationship between a war-fighting strat-
egy and civil defense. If the Soviet Union, for example, can protect
more of its population from the effects of a nuclear war than the
United States, then it may act with more impunity than the United
States. If the dispersion of Soviet military and industrial targets
is considered, it is immediately obvious that Soviet ICBM fields are
separated from cities and industrial targets. With its most likely
targets removed from its people, it can withstand a nuclear attack
against its ICBMs without fearing the loss of its people. The United
States, however, has located its ICBKis in its "heartland". This area
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unfortunately also happens to be directly upwind of its major cities.
In order to affirm the utility of civil defense as a part of a
nuclear war-fighting strategy, it must be agreed that civil defense
can work in a nuclear war. For those who reject this conclusion, their
principle argument is that civil defense cannot protect a population
from the effects of a nuclear attack. This is the "end of modern
civilization" syndrome. For those who accept that civil defense can
work effectively in a nuclear war, it is suggested that the destruc-
tion of modern civilization would occur only in the absence of all
civil defense. In order to die, the attacked population would have to
"cooperate" with the attacker.
In defense of the idea that civil defense can work in a nuclear
war, Donald Brennan, for example, suggests that only 10 to 15 per cent
of the world population would die in a nuclear war in which the United
States and Soviet Union used their entire arsenals. ^6 in this model,
there is a total absence of civil defense. With respect to the United
States, its civilian losses could be as low as 5 per cent with some
civil defense protection, particularly with the evacuation of cities.
In many ways, however, the United States should not be concerned
with protecting countervalue populations, per se, but with protecting
populations that are on the periphery of counterforce targets. Since
a countervalue nuclear war is unlikely to occur at this time, the
primary effort should be to improve population defenses in the vicinity
of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. In a Soviet first-strike attack, for
example, the United States could protect, and thus save, most of its
people from destruction. Only unsheltered or unprotected people need
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die in this war. In 1981 the United States could lose 20 per cent
more civilians than the Soviet Union in a Soviet first strike because
it does not have a credible civil defense pr-ogram.
The probability of a countervalue nuclear war is very low in 1981.
Let us consider, however, the role of civil defense in such a war.
There are several misconceptions to be addressed. First, the detona-
tion of one or even several nuclear weapons will not destroy a city
go
and its people. Even though a single nuclear warhead, such as a 24
megaton weapon, cannot destroy completely an entire city, it is still
very difficult, due to residual factors, chaos, and dislocation, to
protect a population from a direct nuclear attack. That is, an at-
tack that is designed expressly to maximize civilian destruction. If
the probability of a counterforce nuclear war is greater than a coun-
tervalue one, therefore, the value civilian defense is greater than
ever before because it may now be possible to protect virtually all
U.S. civilians from destruction in a nuclear war.
Second, there is the argument that the industrial capacity of a
city or region would automatically be destroyed in a nuclear war. How-
ever, it is possible, and indeed feasible, to protect industrial facil-
ities from nuclear devastation. For example, a nuclear attack against
Leningrad's industrial base would require the detonation of eight one
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megaton warheads to achieve 70 per cent destruction. However, if
the Soviet Union practiced minimal industrial protection, in order to
achieve the same level of destruction (70 per cent), twenty-four one
megaton warheads would have to be detonated over the city. Therefore,
industrial protection can be effective if the purpose is to protect
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a nations' recovery potential.
The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1948 are often
cited, or depicted photographically, as evidence that a nuclear explo-
sion in a city would cause total destruction. There are, however,
several factors to be considered. First, the Japanese were not pre-
pared to exercise civil defense measures in these cities. Worse yet,
the populations in the cities were housed in structures constructed
primarily of wood, paper and other highly combustible materials. When
the nuclear weapon exploded, its fireball ignited these materials and
caused a firestorm, that is, a conflagration in which the flames create
severe winds. In the end, most Japanese suffocated from the lack of
oxygen. Since most American cities are constructed of concrete, brick,
steel, and glass, a firestorm is unlikely to occur. The danger for
Americans is that building components, that are disturbed by the blast,
will become lethal objects as they fly through the air.
Second, the level of industrial damage in Hiroshima, for example,
was quite low. It has been suggested that the Japanese could have
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resumed production within one month of the attack. And with some
industrial protection and civil defense, the cities could have contri-
buted to the Japanese war effort within a short time. For example,
the train system in Hiroshima was operating within 48 hours of the
blast.
Third, whereas the Japanese were totally unprepared, both physi-
cally and psychologically, for a nuclear attack because of the revolu-
tionay nature of the weapon, the U.S. and Soviet populations can be
prepared to survive a nuclear war.^^ Therefore, the arguments that a
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population and its resources cannot be protected against nuclear at-
tack, and that such measures would only cause needless suffering, are
without foundation.
The purpose of a nuclear war-fighting strategy is to preserve
peace. The same is true for civil defense if it is an integral part
of this strategy. Thus, civil defense would not degrade crisis sta-
bility or peace-time stability.^"^ Thus, the ability to protect a popu-
lation from nuclear attack means that nuclear war may have no useful
purpose. If a nation cannot disarm or destroy the people of another
nation, then what purpose could the war serve? The answer seems to be
none. The United States, for example, cannot expect to defeat the
Soviet Union if it can protect its people from destruction. Therefore,
with respect to deterrence, symmetrical civil defense capabilities
will maintain deterrence.
Soviet civil defense capabilities, however, greatly exceed those
of the United States in terms of planning, staffing, and expenditures.
In this respect the status quo is not secure for the United States.
The ability to protect its' population (and industry) from the effects
of a nuclear war could mean that the Soviet Union can win a nuclear
war. Further, its potential for recovery is also higher. For the op-
ponents of civil defense, the Soviet Union's preoccupation with civil
defense may come as a bit of a surprise. There is no evidence to in-
dicate that the Soviet civil defense system would not be effective, as
all suggestions about the function of civil defense during an actual
nuclear war are uncertain. If, however, the Soviet system does work
in a nuclear war, then the United States would certainly lose the war.
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More importantly, the United States might be deterred from nuclear war
by the threat of Soviet civil defense. There is perhaps no greater
defeat than one in which the United States loses its ICBMs and its
people, but the Soviet Union loses neither.
The U.S. Civil Defense Capability
The most recent U.S. proposal for civil defense is to relocate and
evacuate the U.S. populations that are in the vicinity of U.S. ICBMs.
The ability to evacuate and relocate such populations may be quite
rational given that the likelihood of a counterforce nuclear war is
greater than a countervalue one. Such a plan would not be inexpensive,
but can have substantial benefits with respect to survival in a nuclear
war.
Although there are a variety of measures to protect people and
buildings from destruction in a nuclear war, the most feasible option
is to protect people trapped in a war zone and remove those who can-
not be protected. For example, when the United States notes that
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civil defense "can make sense in a crisis,' it is affirming that
the purpose of civil defense is to "enhance, in the event of a nuclear
war, the survivability of the American people and its leadership,
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thereby improving the basis for eventual national recovery,"
If an equation exists for the protection of people and buildings
in a nuclear war, then the size of the nuclear exchange would figure
dominantly in the calculation. Since the objective of civil defense
is to preserve the civilian and material infrastructure of the state,
civil defense can also reduce unintended collateral damage. In sum.
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however, the real purpose behind the revival of U.S. civil defense
planning is the Soviet civil defense program. In association with a
war-survival strategy, the Soviet preoccupation with civil defense
continues to raise serious questions for the United States. If it
does not match Soviet efforts, then it may lose a nuclear war or be
deterred from fighting one.
If the United States is to have a coherent civil defense scheme,
it must become part of the national economic, political, and psychologi-
cal fabric of the nation. Training programs, rehearsals, and a civil
defense corp are necessary on a scale heretofore unimagined in the
United States. In order to implement a civil defense program that
is credible and effective, the U.S. population must understand that
this will increase the number of Americans that survive a nuclear at-
tack. If this support from the public is not forthcoming, then civil
defense would fail for two reasons. First, a low level of public sup-
port means that the program will receive minimal funding. In this
case, the level of funding will determine the program's effectiveness.
Second, civil defense measures lacking total public support would not
receive the attention and practice that are necessary for success in a
nuclear war.
There is no possibility that the United States could disguise
this activity from the Soviet Union, and there is little reason to do
so. It may be that a U.S. civil defense program would make the Soviet
Union think that it is preparing to fight a nuclear war. Thus, it
could force the Soviet Union to launch first in a crisis. This argu-
ment, however, fails to appreciate that if the Soviet Union is aware
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that the United States places a high value on the preservation of its
people, then the Soviet Union would avoid actions leading to war be-
cause it would realize that the United States would fight to protect
its people. Further, an effective U.S. civil defense system would re-
duce the probability of Soviet victory in a nuclear war. Civil defense.
It can be argued, reinforces deterrence.
The Post Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST), which was conducted by the
U.S. National Security Council, concludes that a civil defense program
funded with 35 billion dollars could reduce casualties from a Soviet
nuclear attack to 5.5 per cent of the U.S. population. This study
considered a Soviet nuclear attack in which 60 per cent of its' nuclear
weapons were targeted against U.S. civilian centers. However, if the
United States did not have a civil defense capability, then this attack
would kill or injure 45 per cent of its' population. If the United
States spent 500 million dollars for a "counterevacuation" plan, casual-
ties could be reduced to 11 per cent.^^ Since the most likely nuclear
attack is a counterforce one, this may understate the lifesaving poten-
tial of civil defense.
The opponents of civil defense argue that since perfect civil de-
fense is not feasible, even a minor civil defense system would in
reality cost hundreds of billions of dollars and would still be a
farce with respect to protecting the U.S. population. ^"^^ In order to
conclude that civil defense is ineffective or simply a waste of time
and resources, it is necessary to accept the argument that fifteen
million dead Americans are indistinguishable from 100 million dead.
It may be the case that even fifteen million dead would create immense
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political and tactical problems for the United States, but the point
is that the survival of a large percentage of the population would
provide a pool of talent from which recovery would begin. If the dis-
tinction, with respect to civil defense, were "only" five million peo-
ple, then civil defense may be impractical. But when differences of
opinion concern the fate of 85 million or more people, it may have
some value in a nuclear war.
The exception to this argument is that, if the United States
develops a laser ballistic-missile defense system, then this technologi-
cal revolution will reverse the need for civil defense. Thus, the
only reasonable argument against a U.S. civil defense program is that
it may be outdated by technological innovation. Opponents of civil
defense, however, rarely cite this argument. This deletion is quite
devastating in itself.
The level of residual fallout from a nuclear attack, especially
from ground-burst nuclear explosions, presents a severe problem for
civil defense. More precisely, it is the length of time that a popu-
lation must spend in a shelter that determines the probability of sur-
vival. For example, exposure to more than 500 rems of radiation would
cause severe radiation sickness with nausea, vomiting, and general
collapse leading eventually to death. But radiation and its effects
decay with time. Within two weeks of a blast, the radiation level is
only 7 per cent of its original value. As these figures apply only
to areas subjected to a direct attack, peripheral areas require less
shelter time, and little or no protection is necessary in unaffected
areas. Thus, if shelters are equipped with sufficient food and water
for 14 to 17 days, a large percentage of the sheltered population can
survive the attack. If the population is protected in "expedient"
shelters, that is shelters that are constructed to provide maximum
radiation protection, its occupants would not experience any form of
radiation sickness.
For example, shelter systems of this form can limit fatal cancers
to 200 per million population after a 5,000 megaton nuclear war.^*^^
Further, peripheral attack areas would have substantially less casual-
ties than immediate attack areas, if the population is protected. This
also increases the number of survivors. The more dangerous effects of
a nuclear attack (blast, fire, radiation and thermal radiation) can
also be minimized if the affected zone is evacuated or the population
is sheltered. Thus, even a modest U.S. civil defense system could
protect those people who would otherwise die very horrible deaths.
Soviet Civil Defense Systems
If Soviet civil defense activity is any indication, the Soviet
Union has apparently concluded that civil defense is essential in a
nuclear war if the United States launches a nuclear strike against its
countervalue targets. The Soviet Union, therefore, apparently be-
lieves that civil defense can protect its population from the side
effects of a nuclear war and that people can survive after such a war.
In effect, its civil defense is a reflection of a specific assessment
of future international relations: that the probability of a nuclear
war is high enough to warrant protecting its population.
The Soviet civil defense system, which can protect its skilled
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populations and political clitcs,'^^ is quite significant because it
weakens deterrence and wrecks havoc on traditional analysis of nuclear
war and retaliation. Like the Soviet Union, the United States may
believe that with modern technology population protection is possible.
But unlike the Soviet Union, the United States is apparently willing
to sacrifice a large percentage of its population. Thus, the Soviet
Union emphasizes its evacuation program. What are the implications
of this system?
The Soviet evacuation plan seeks to remove its population from
target complexes that are likely to be attacked in a nuclear war. At
a minimum, Soviet evacuation would reduce the number of fatalities
that otherwise would occur. If the Soviet Union evacuates its cities,
then the United States can attack them without fear of destroying
civilians. However, with the exception of certain vital targets, the
United States is advised to avoid attacking Soviet cities, whether popu-
lated or evacuated, because, as noted, any Soviet countervalue attack
would always be more destructive than a U.S. countervalue attack. Thus,
the assertion that Soviet evacuation eases U.S. targeting requirements
is not only wrong but dangerous.
If the Soviet Union evacuates its cities, should the United States
attack?^^^ Because it is uncertain whether the Soviet Union would
evacuate, the question is somewhat speculative. It is, however,
possible to propose some guidelines equivalent to launch-on-warning.
This is called "launch-on-evacuation." First, if the Soviet Union
evacuates only one city the United States should not attack because it
might be a drill. It is, however, unlikely that the Soviet Union
would evacuate Moscow, for example, in a drill. With the exception of
major cities, an evacuation is not particularly worrisome for the
United States.
Second, if the Soviet Union evacuates more than one city near its
ICBM fields, then the most advisable action for the United States would
be to launch a strike against that ICBM complex before evacuation is
complete. Not only does this suggest to the Soviet Union that the
Untted States is fully alerted, but it decreases any incentive to empty
probable attack areas before war. If it is clear that Soviet evacua-
tion causes limited U.S. nuclear attacks, then it would be counter-
productive.
The purpose of civil defense is to preserve deterrence without
sacrificing national interests or decreasing Soviet and American securi-
ty. The goal, therefore, is symmetrical civil defense capabilities.
Parity then is defined as the ability to protect an equal number of
civilians. For example, if the Soviet Union would lose 5 to 10 per
cent of its population in a nuclear attack, while the United States
would lose 40 to 50 per cent of its population in the same attack, then
the United States is more likely to be deterred from nuclear war.
Thus, deterrence in this age depends on the number of civilians that
a nation can kill in retaliation, as long as that number equals the
number of civilians that the opponent would lose.
It may be argued that the Soviet Union's civil defense program is
ineffective and wasteful because it ignores the basic logic of nuclear
war: that everyone loses. However, it is very difficult to accept
the argument that only the United States understands the nature of
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nuclear war, and that therefore, the Soviet civil defense is based on
erroneous calculations. Further, a total rejection of civil defense
is absurd because to do so would assume that there is perfect certain-
ty about the efficacy of civil defense in a nuclear war, or that there
is no possibility for success. It is equally difficult to accept the
idea that the Soviet Union pursues civil defense only for internal,
propagandistic, and ideological reasons. Given the scale of the Soviet
civil defense effort, someone, somewhere in the Kremlin is convinced
that it can work.
Civil defense can be divided into two distinct, yet related realms:
population defense and industrial protection. At this time, the United
States could overpower the Soviet civil defense programs with a ten-
fold increase in total mega tonnage or number of warheads. To over-
power the Soviet Union's industrial protection system would require a
threefold increase in its nuclear capability. While the Soviet Union
would lose about 5 to 10 per cent of its population if the United
States attacked Soviet population and industrial targets, the United
States could lose about 50 per cent of its population in a similar
Soviet attack. Thus, the crucial difference between U.S. and Soviet
civil defense theories is that the Soviet Union would evacuate its'
city populations to outlying areas where civil defense shelters will
be constructed in two to three days.^^^ While the United States has
no such plan for evacuation, it is suggested by one study that the
Soviet Union has indeed rehearsed city evacuations.
Another factor that is related to the ability to protect a popu-
lation is the dispersion of non-military and military targets. By
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virtue of size and a deliberate policy to disperse its industrial
assets, Soviet cities and industry are more dispersed than those in
the United States. For example, nine cities in the Soviet Union with
a population of one million or more contain 20.5 million people, which
was about 8.5 per cent of the Soviet population in 1970. However, in
the United States, 35 cities having one million or more people contain
84.5 million people or about 41.5 per cent of the U.S. population in
1970.^^2 u 5^ nuclear attack against the Soviet Union could kill
perhaps 5 per cent of its population. A Soviet attack, however, could
kill 40 per cent of the U.S. population. Thus, the U.S. population
at risk in a nuclear war may be substantially greater than any Soviet
population so threatened.
A further element of the Soviet Union's civil defense protection
system is the protection of its industrial facilities. The most illus-
trative study in this field, the Boeing study, concludes that Soviet
methods for industrial protection are indeed effective given a three
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day warning period. Since the Soviet method for industrial protec-
tion is lo bury iiidchiuory in dirt, Lhe Boeing sLudy uffiniis that, with
this method, attacked installations could resume production in 12
weeks, and reach the 1978 production level in one year. However, if
the same building were unprotected, the level of destruction would be
irreparable. For example, a factory could return to 100 per cent
production within 4 days of a 300 psi blast. Damaged machinery,
incidentally, can be repaired with undamaged equipment. The most
important fact is that there is no upper limit of overpressure against
which machinery cannot be protected. Thus, there is no limit to
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industrial protection against nuclear blast.
Therefore, the level of industrial recovery depends on the per-
centage of undestroyed industrial capacity. However, the recovery
potential is not simply a function of the number of buildings that is
left intact, but the percentage of salvageable industrial equipment.
Since the Soviet Union may be prepared to protect its industrial as-
sets, it is possible that it could recover from a nuclear war.
What precisely is a "recovery potential?" First, it means that
a nation can resume industrial production at a rate that allows it
to reach its pre-war level in a short period of time. In this case,
a short period of time is ten years or less. For the United States to
subject a 5 year recovery time on the Soviet Union it would have to
expend its entire strategic reserve forces that is left over from a
Soviet counterforce first-strike attack. If the Soviet Union takes
even more ambitious steps to protect its economic and personnel infra-
structure, then the United States could not substantially increase the
Soviet recovery time beyond 5 years. Given the usual level of uncer-
tainty, it may be as high as 10 years. In either case, deterrence is
jeopardized.
The final element of a nuclear war survival strategy is the
protection of national, political, military, economic, and ideological
elites. This is the population that directs the war and guides post-
war recovery. The Soviet Union apparently can protect its total elite
population of 110,000 in hardened, underground command bunkers.^
A similar system is prepared for the skilled workers that manage the
Soviet technocratic state. Although these shelters cannot withstand
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direct attack, the Soviet Union nonetheless stocks the same with food,
water and supplies for a protracted "stay." In fact, the Soviet Union
may be stockpiling the grain sold by the United States in this system
of shelters. With these supplies the Soviet Union could feed its
people for up to 2 years. The shelter system could also protect
another 25 per cent of the Soviet working population in the ancillary
shelter system located at industrial sites.
There are strategies by which the United States can defeat such
measures. For example, the United States could detonate very dirty
warheads, that is, warheads coated with lead, cobalt or strontium,
near these shelters. If such areas are irradiated for hundreds of
years, the Soviets would die in their shelters. If the United States
did this, it would certainly win the war, but there are easier and
more reliable methods to achieve this goal. For example, the United
States can attack directly underground Soviet shelters with the Persh-
ing II missile. This warhead penetrates the earth to destroy the
shelter with blast and heat.
In summary, the purpose of civil defense is not to prevent all
destruction, but to limit destruction to manageable levels. Thus,
civil defense is a key element in a limited nuclear war strategy.
Further, the ability to recover from nuclear war is directly related
to the quality and size of the surviving population. While the United
States and Soviet Union cannot hope to escape unscathed from a nuclear
war, they may be able to limit damage so that recovery can be completed
in a reasonable length of time. Therefore, with respect to nuclear
war-fighting and deterrence, if the Soviet Union can recover from a
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nuclear war before the United States, then it would win the war. If
the United States neglects to have a civil or industrial defense sys-
tem, it is conceivable that it could never recover from the war. In-
deed, if Colin Gray is correct, that "civil defense programs continue
115
to be accorded little more than token concern' then the United
States can lose a nuclear war.
CHAPTER V
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR IN THE FUTURE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine future nuclear war-fight-
ing and counterforce systems in order to predict how future nuclear
wars could be fought. Since nuclear systems are interactive, the de-
fensive and offensive elements of a war-fighting strategy are its pri-
mary concerns. Therefore, the MX ICBM and laser defensive systems are
examined.
The Offense : MX ICBMs
For the time being, the ICBM remains the most capable weapon in
the United States' and Soviet Union's nuclear arsenals. The United
States must, therefore, deploy a new ICBM if it is to remain even par-
tially equal to the Soviet Union with respect to ICBMs. If the United
States can match the hard-target kill capabilities of Soviet ICBMs,
nuclear war is less likely to occur. It is in this context that the
MX ICBM is analyzed.
The principal war-fighting characteristics of the MX ICBM are the
large number of warheads per missile and the yield and accuracy of those
warheads. The MX will be deployed with ten, 350 kiloton warheads, each
having an accuracy of 0.1 nm. In this configuration, the MX will mir-
ror the first-strike capabilities of the Soviet Union's SS-17, SS-18
and SS-19 ICBMs in the number of MIRVs and in warhead accuracy. The
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yield, however, will be substantially less than that of the SS-18,
which is approximately 1 megaton.
One of the most important axioms of nuclear war deterring is that
stability depends on symmetrical strategic capabilities. If one side
possesses superior ICBMs, for example, the opponent may be pressured
to launch first in order to avoid their destruction and, thus, defeat.
Therefore, the United States should not allow the Soviet Union to con-
tinue its deployment of more capable, and hence superior, ICBMs. There-
fore, development of a modern ICBM, whatever the deployment mode, is
imperative for the United States. For example, the most capable ICBM
in the U.S. arsenal is the Minuteman III, is inferior to Soviet ICBMs
in all measurable respects. The critical drawbacks of the Minuteman
III are the smaller number of warheads per ICBM and their smaller
yields. Concerned with ICBM survivability, the United States may be
forced to consider a radical departure in ICBM design. The MX repre-
sents just such a change. In what ways is the MX radically different
in comparison with past U.S. ICBMs?
First, as a very large ICBM, the MX enables the United States to
deploy a large number of warheads per missile. Even the destruction
of 100 of the planned 200 missiles would still allow surviving ICBMs
to attack 1,000 targets. Thus, it can destroy a large fraction of the
Soviet ICBM force quite easily. The configuration (i.e. yield and
accuracy) of the warheads also suggests that the United States sees a
need for the ability to destroy hard targets.
Second, the MX represents the beginning of a U.S. first-strike
capability. Given the exigencies of modern nuclear warfare, and
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the Soviet Union's apparent first-strike capability, the United States
has no choice but to develop its own such force. Stable deterrence
now depends on the existence of equal first-strike forces, so that even
50 per cent destruction does not deplete a nation's ability to fight a
nuclear war to a successful conclusion. Although this revolution in
nuclear warfare was caused by certain technological changes such as
guidance and warhead design. It is not apparent that deterrence has
really changed. The fundamental rule of modern deterrence theory,
that is for the 1980s and beyond, is that a nation shall not be depriv-
ed of a war-waging force by even the most successful enemy assault.
Third, the MX ICBM is designed to reduce the vulnerability of the
fixed-site ICBM.^^^ As noted earlier, the Soviet Union can destroy
at will a substantial portion of the U.S. ICBM force. In order to
avoid the problems of fixed-site basing, the MX deployment should be
mobile, and situated in areas that are more difficult to attack such
as mountain valleys. In general, however, they should be far removed
from the continental United States.
Since most analysts agree that U.S. ICBMs are vulnerable to a So-
viet first-strike attack, the issue is not whether the United States
should reduce such vulnerability, but how and with what systems. Given
the scale of the Soviet threat to U.S. ICBMs, if the United States does
not deploy a new ICBM soon, other temporary measures may be necessary.
However, if the MX ICBM is deployed, it will pose a threat to the
Soviet ICBM force, and simultaneously reduce the survivability of
Soviet ICBMs to a level equal with U.S. ICBMs in 1981. This is not to
suggest that the Soviet threat to U.S. ICBMs, as the cause celebre for
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the MX ICBM, is constant. On the contrary, continued deployment of
more hard-target capable Soviet ICBMs increases U.S. ICBM vulnerabili-
ty each year. In order to forestall overwhelming Soviet strategic
superiority, the United States can place MX ICBMs in Minuteman III
silos. This, however, does not solve the problem of vulnerability.
The U.S. Air Force bases its calculations of future U.S. ICBM
capabilities on retention of the Minuteman as well as the MX. There-
fore, placing MX ICBMs in Minuteman silos could be just the measure to
reduce near time vulnerability and increase ICBM survivability. The
uncertain and unstable Congressional mood probably worries the Air
Force that once the MX is in the silos, nothing short of a Soviet
counterforce strike would move it.
The most important assumptions with respect to an ICBM are that
it should be able to destroy Soviet nuclear forces, equal the war-
fighting capability of Soviet ICBMs, and balance overall U.S. and
Soviet war-fighting capabilities. The MX meets these criteria. Not
only will the MX ICBM increase U.S. war-fighting capabilities and
reduce vulnerability, but it will allow the United States to attack
with confidence a range of Soviet targets that it otherwise could not
destroy. The Soviet Union, therefore, can no longer be certain that
its ICBMs will survive a U.S. first-strike, and that U.S. reserve
forces will remain at levels that do not favor the United States in
nuclear exchanges. For example, with the Minuteman III force the
United States cannot destroy Soviet ICBMs even using the entire force.
With 500 MX ICBMs, however, only 30 per cent could destroy Soviet
ICBMs with a confidence level exceeding 90 per cent.
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Hard-target counterforce capabilities are here to stay. It is
unlikely that the United States can persuade the Soviet Union to fore-
go this. Further, the notion that the MX ICQM would cause the Soviet
Union to reconsider the race for such capabilities is mistaken.
There is doubt whether the United States should deploy the MX
because it may be seen as destabilizing by the Soviet Union, it threa-
tens the Soviet Union's ICBM force, and raises nuclear competition to
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a new height. These assertions are on the whole without foundation.
First, by all standard calculations of ICBM capabilities, the Soviet
Union has deployed ICBMs that are at least one order of magnitude more
capable than the U.S. ICBMs. The destabilizing potential of this ICBM
force has caused the United States to rethink its nuclear strategy.^
The MX ICBM, however, will not match Soviet ICBM capabilities because
Soviet ICBMs carry substantially larger warheads. Thus, in terms of
warhead yield, the MX is inferior. Since the United States plans to
deploy only 200 MX ICBMs, in numerical terms the MX is also inferior.
Opponents, however, point out that the Soviet ICBM force contains the
bulk of its nuclear power. To threaten this force, it is argued,
violates stability and forces the Soviet Union to strike preemptively.
The MX, therefore, should not be deployed.
Second, the MX may threaten the Soviet ICBM force more than Soviet
ICBMs threaten the United States. Consider, however, the dimensions
of the Soviet ICBM threat. The Soviet Union deploys approximately 600
counterforce ICBMs in 1981; with the MX the United States would have
200 modern counterforce ICBMs and 550 semi -competent counterforce
ICBMs. Therefore, even with the MX, the Soviet threat to the U.S.
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ICBMs is greater. Although the wisdom of the attack might be in doubt,
the MX could attack countervalue targets. Even if the MX is used in
countervalue strikes, the Soviet Union still retains ICBM superiority.
Thus, it can be argued that the MX neither threatens Soviet ICBMs nor
poses any threat that is not at least balanced by a reciprocal Soviet
threat.
Third, it is suggested that the MX ICBM will stimulate a new
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round in the arms race. However, this criticism would carry more
weight if the Soviet Union had not deployed its SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs
before the MX. Therefore, the United States will build the MX as its'
response to the arms race started by the Soviet Union's deployment of
its most modern ICBMs.
The MX ICBM would not, in terms of its present configuration, un-
nerve the Soviet Union in a crisis with the possibility of a first-
strike. Moreover, the MX is not designed to create strategic counter-
force superiority. Quite the opposite are true. The MX ICBM is not,
by any measure, a first-strike weapon per se , because it only balances
Soviet and American first-strike capabilities. A first-strike force
does not occur as the result of a new ICBM. More precisely, only one
nation can have a true first-strike capability at one time. To acquire
a "preclusive first-strike capability," requires not only ICBMs, but
secure communications and control, a civil defense program, and a de-
fensive network. In these respects, the United States is indeed very
far from achieving an "interlocking first-strike capability."
The most devastating fault of American strategic analysis is the
tendency to view strategy as a function of discrete military capabilities.
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For example, the MX ICBM may be viewed as a destabilizing or even rev-
olutionary weapon on its war-fighting merits alone; thus, the United
States does not think of the multiple factors that may make nuclear
war unwinnable even with the MX. This is, one suspects, an example of
the American technological mind.
The concept of an "interlocking first-strike capability" is in-
teresting because it addresses the idea of an integrated nuclear stra-
tegy. It reduces dependence on individual elements of nuclear capa-
bility, and introduces the notion of overlapping nuclear capabilities,
emphasizing the offense, with ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers with cruise
missiles, and the defense, with secure communication, command and
control, civil and industrial defense, and active missile defense sys-
tems. Up to this time, the United States was content to think in terms
of an offensive nuclear strategy because the possibility of an effec-
tive defense against nuclear attack was not realistic. As this obsta-
cle to an interlocking strategy is about to be removed by a laser
ballistic missile defense system, with a defensive system, it is appro-
priate to consider it as the final component of a war-fighting strate-
gy. Nuclear war may no longer be suicidal, but can be a more reason-
able instrument of national policy.
The Defense : Laser Ballistic Missile Defenses
Since the security of fixed, and perhaps mobile, U.S. nuclear
systems is threatened by the increasingly capable Soviet targeting sys-
tem, the United States must consider the deployment of defensive strate-
gic systems. There is an indication that the offensive, which was long
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cited as the doiiiinant and most cflcctive strategy in nuclear war, may
be superceded by the defense. Such systems may perhaps be superior
with respect to combat effectiveness and a higher level of confidence
in its' ability to limit damage. The premier defensive weapon for the
foreseeable future is the laser. It is conceivable that the laser can
intercept all ballistic missiles before they can reach their targets.
Further, there is such a high probability of destruction, that the
offense may be inadequate for winning a nuclear war.
The second-strike and essentially defensive character of U.S.
nuclear strategy supports the shift, both ideologically and political-
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ly, to a laser ballistic missile defense. The offense is no longer
the most rational tactic in nuclear war because, for example, laser
ballistic missile defense will radically improve nuclear war-fighting
capabilities. Even civil defense takes on an entirely different mean-
ing in relation to it. Further, it is conceivable that the laser, as
a defensive anti-ICBM weapon can destroy all incoming warheads, and
prevent the detonations of nuclear weapons on U.S. soil.
The United States is advised to integrate a laser ballistic mis-
sile defense system into its strategy for fighting and winning a nu-
clear war. The immense value of a laser system in this capacity sug-
gests no less.
Traditional anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems utilize a force
of high speed, nuclear-armed missiles to destroy the incoming war-
heads. It is, however, relatively easy for the attacker to defeat
this system with decoys, barrage attacks and saturation attacks. Offen
sive countermeasures are therefore cheaper than the defense. But with
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a laser system, there are no facile counteriiieasures for the attacker.
Thus, the laser, which can destroy incoming warheads and anti-satell i te
systeiis with a high probability, would give the defender a more ad-
vantageous position in a nuclear war. It is this revolution in the
offense/defense equation that weighs most favorable in the decision to
deploy a laser ballistic missile defense.
As an acronym for "light amplification by stimulated emission of
radiation," a laser focuses the quanta of light energy, photons, into
a coherent beam of light. The intensity of this emission varies direct-
ly with the power input. Given sufficient intensity, a laser can be
targeted on a moving vehicle hundreds of kilometers away. The destruc-
tion of an ICBM warhead thus naturally suggests itself. Since the
laser moves at the speed of light, targeting is less complex than with
conventional weaponry because the target does not move relative to the
speed of the laser beam.
An anti-ICBM laser ballistic missile defense system can work in
two ways. First, the laser beam may be "pulsed" so that the ICBM war-
head or ICBM itself is destroyed by the shock effect of the beam hit-
tirvg the object millions of times per second. The destruction of the
missile results from the forces imparted to the missile skin by the
successive laser "impacts." The second type of anti-ICBM laser bal-
listic missile defense system is a continuous output laser beam. By
focusing a beam on the missile for 3 or 4 seconds, the missile compo-
nents: electrical, mechanical and warhead fusing instruments, are
overheated. In either case the laser disables the missile so that,
failing to execute the proper reentry procedures, it burns up as it
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re-enters the atmosphere.
The offensive ICBM, however, can take defensive measures to pre-
vent destruction by the defensive laser. An ICBM can be coated with
reflective substances in order to deflect the laser. The drawback
to this option is that in order to protect the missile by increasing
its resistance to laser "flux" by a factor of 2, the missile's destruc-
tive power is reduced by the same factor of 2.^^^ Therefore, in order
to double the protection factor of a missile, about 50 per cent of its
throw-weight is used. For example, if the Soviet SS-18 ICBM were to
be protected by a factor of 2, the number of warheads would either
have to be reduced from 10 to 5, or the yield of the warheads reduced
from 1 megaton to 500 kilotons. Therefore, the counterforce capability
of an ICBM is reduced by a factor of 2.
The most efficient deployment scheme for a laser ballistic mis-
sile defense system would be a network of satellites, in orbit about
800 miles above the earth. This orbit allows the system to cover all
possible launch and impact zones on the globe. Deployment of a laser
system would require abrogation of the 1972 ACM Treaty between the
United States and the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union deploys a
laser ballistic missile defense system before the United States, the
U.S. inferiority would be assured. It could lose a nuclear war because
it could not inflict even minor damage in the Soviet Union. Parentheti-
cally, laser ballistic missile defense systems will be deployed in
earth orbit because a laser works best in the exoatmospheric mode due
to the loss of power that occurs when it passes through the atmosphere.
There are, however, indications that lasers will soon be able to attack
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endoatmospheric targets.
The United States can probably deploy a modest laser ballistic
missile defense system by 1983.^^^ It is unlikely that the Defense
Department is stalling the deployment because the space race is more
urgent than ever, now that the Soviet Union is putting vast financial
and organizational resources into its laser program. Thus, a laser
system can offset the need for the MX ICBM. In fact, a laser ballistic
missile defense system could be deployed faster than the proposed MX
system and would offer substantially more security. With respect to
a nuclear war-fighting strategy, the laser can mitigate the effects of
a nuclear war, reduce damage to the United States, and perhaps provide
the victory that some claim is illusory.
The exact characteristics of an anti-ICBM laser system are a
closely-guarded national secret. It is possible, however, to speculate
about how it might be deployed. Even a small-scale deployment of 4
laser satellites could, according to Senator Malcolm Wallop, threaten
Soviet SLBMs which are very vulnerable during their relatively slow
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"boost" phase. If that initial laser ballistic missile defense sys-
tem was expanded, Soviet ICBM and SLBM attacks, so often cited as the
most threatening, would become far less worrisome to the United States.
If the laser system is expanded to 12 satellites, the United States
could seriously degrade any Soviet first-strike attack or retalia-
tion. If 36 laser satellites were deployed, the United States could
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intercept all first-strike attacks.
Further, a laser satellite system can protect the U.S. command,
control and coii»iiunication satellites from Soviet attack. The Soviet
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Union has a minor anti-satellite (ASAT) system at present, but this
would be quite ineffective against a laser system because it could
destroy aVi satellites cotning within a preprogrammed range. Thus, one
laser satellite could protect vital satellites, while 24 laser
satellites could defeat a Soviet counterforce attack.
There is an additional serendipitious effect to a laser satellite
system: the destruction of any laser satellites, as difficult as that
might be, provides virtually conclusive proof that Soviet nuclear
hostilities are imminent or already underway.
A great virtue of the laser system is that it can be programmed
to attack without direct human control, and thus does not require con-
stant human surveillance. Some would resist this type of control.
There is, however, no evidence to indicate that an automated response
increases the probability of nuclear war, or that it can start a war
without proper authorization or political justification. Let us say
that a laser satellite system attacked a Soviet satellite or booster
without provocation due to mechanical error. Its destruction would
neither be irreparable nor sufficient to start a nuclear war. The
worst a laser can do is destroy a missile or satellite. (That it can
defeat an enemy attack is obvious). In sum, the laser offers positive
control over nuclear weapons and reduces the potential destruction of
a nuclear war to manageable levels.
The stability of the nuclear balance is dependent on the ability
of the United States and Soviet Union to survive a first strike. How-
ever, Soviet first-strike capabilities today are not matched by the
United States. Coupled with Soviet civil defense, counterforce ICBMs
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and projected reserve forces, the value of a Soviet laser system is
even more pronounced because the Soviet Union could effectively deter
any adversary froin a nuclear confrontation.
If the Soviet Union deploys such a system before the United
States, it would immediately gain strategic superiority In order
to prevent this from happening, the United States should deploy a laser
system as soon as possible. In the event that either nation, that is,
the United States or Soviet Union, deployed a laser ballistic missile
defense system before the other, the only logical response for the
other would be to develop a ground-based laser to disable the space-
based version. It might be impossible to deploy a space-based version
because the other nation could shoot down, with the space-based version,
all orbital vehicles containing a laser. Therefore, the alternative
to the deployment of a laser ballistic missile defense system is
strategic inferiority rather than superiority, MAD rather than assured
protection/survival, and a war-losing rather than war-winning posture.
While the Soviet Union has certainly made inroads toward a defensive
nuclear doctrine, the United States can reverse this imbalance with
a laser ballistic missile defense system and attain gross operational
superiority in nuclear war-fighting.
A Soviet laser ballistic missile defense system would be quite
threatening because, with its civil defense system, it has establish-
ed the organizational and strategic basis for a damage limiting strate-
gy in nuclear war. The synergistic effect of a Soviet laser ballistic-
missile defense and civil defense capability could overwhelm the
United States. It would not be able to defeat the Soviet Union in a
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nuclear war.
It is apparent that the Soviet Union is actively developing laser
ballistic-missile defense systems with a large financial and organiza-
tional commitment. If the Soviet Union does beat the United States in
the race to deploy lasers, it would as the New York Times notes,
effectively "checkmate" U.S. nuclear strategy. With this possibili-
ty in mind, the United States is for example, hardening its satellites
against either ground-based or space-based laser attacks. Development
of the so-called "hunter-killer" satellites has also begun: that is,
satellites that can destroy enemy satellites by exploding within a
lethal distance.
In what may be the strategic race of the century, the United
States and Soviet Union are pushing their laser development programs
to the limits of technology and expertise. The most revolutionary
feature of the laser is that the United States and/or the Soviet Union
could disrupt a full-scale nuclear war before any nuclear weapons could
strike their targets. Indeed, future "nuclear" wars will not consist
of nuclear explosions, counterforce duels, and countervalue strikes,
but laser "duels" that cause no identifiable destruction. Nuclear
technology would then be obsolete.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, the opening argument stressed that Mutually Assured
Destruction was not sufficient alone as a nuclear strategy for the
United States. Stress was placed on the antiquated strategy and its
irrational choices in a nuclear war. In keeping with technological
revolutions, counterforce nuclear strategy bridged the gap between MAD
and the more modern strategy of nuclear war-fighting. The "bridge,"
as it were, is the destruction of military targets, especially ICBMs,
SLBMs, and bombers. The most radical element of a war-fighting strate-
gy is that tne destruction of political and military targest will cause
political as well as military defeat . Therefore, it is suggested that
the primary rationale for a nuclear war-fighting strategy is not retal-
iation, punishment or revenge, but only defeat of the enemy. This
change is no less than revolutionary.
Development of a comprehensive strategy for fighting and winning
a nuclear war has not only theoretical but practical problems, not the
least of which is the organization of essentially "hypothetical" issues
into a theoretical framework for the policymaker. Thus, the purpose
of this work is to explicate the blatant as well as subtle meanings and
implications of the strategy, and to examine its consequences. With
respect to a policymaker, some solutions to questions about strategy
and deployments are suggested. Therefore, a series of propositions
about the fundamental issues of the strategy are outlined below.
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Assumptions
1. In the future the ability to deter nuclear war will depend on
survivable war-fighting forces, that is, forces that can attack all
Soviet military and political targets. Deterrence, therefore, is no
longer seen as the ability to assure mutual destruction but the ability
to defeat an adversary. The purpose of any nuclear strike is to de-
feat the enemy; attacks, however, are not to punish the enemy. This
strategy will force the Soviet Union to rethink its nuclear strategy;
more importantly, nuclear war is no longer to be considered suicidal.
2. There is only one reason for fighting a nuclear war, and that
is to win. The Soviet Union, for example, cannot think that it will
automatically win a nuclear war, but must assume that the United
States also seeks to win. Therefore, the ability to win a nuclear
war rests on survivable nuclear forces.
The United States must accept the idea that the defeat of the
Soviet Union in a nuclear war is the nearest thing to a central organiz-
ing principle for its strategy. Such defeat must be total and complete,
and focus on the Soviet ability to fight immediate and protracted nu-
clear wars. For example, ICBMs as well as industrial facilities must
be destroyed. Defeat, therefore, will involve capitulation when
further Soviet action does not ensure victory. If it is clear that
the United States will dispassionately destroy the Soviet Union, then
nuclear war is less likely to occur.
3. Nuclear war will no longer be described as an irrational and
suicidal event. It will, however, be fought for a specific political
purpose, such as defeat, and will not be fought to ensure mutual
defeat.
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Recommendations
In order to implement a complete war-fighting nuclear strategy,
the proper nuclear forces are necessary. Stress is placed on the de-
ployment of nuclear war-fighting systems, with which an enemy can be
defeated and the vital assets of the United States protected. Further,
it is essential to increase the costs to the Soviet Union of fighting
a nuclear war. Deterrence, therefore, is a significant issue.
1. It is imperative that the United States deploy a new ICBM.
Emphasis should be on its survivability and war-fighting capabilities.
In particular, it should be MIRVed with at least ten but up to twenty
nuclear warheads. Maneuverable warhead technologies will increase its
ability to destroy hard targets. Thus, a CEP of 0.1 nm or less and
a warhead yield of 500 kilotons are essential. A cold-launch capa-
bility, and rapid reload as well, would further weaken the power of
an otherwise potentially disarming Soviet first-strike attack. In the
event the Soviet Union does launch a first strike, the ICBM should be
able to launch from under a nuclear attack, which means that hardening
measures are necessary. Some shielding from nuclear blast and EMP,
as well as an extremely fast rate of acceleration are required. If
The Soviet Union's civil defense capability is to be circumvented,
the ICBM should carry random dirty warheads so that survival in shelters
would mean staying underground for centuries. Thus, the Soviet Union
could not protect its people and would, perhaps, be deterred from war.
The ICBM should be deployed using a variety of modes. First,
basing the ICBM in deep rock shelters, interspersed among mountain
valleys, would increase the difficulty of destroying them. Second,
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sotiie of the ICBMs should be deployed in u mobile system: launchers,
either on ships (such as Project HYDRA, in which ICBMs are stored on
ships. Launching involves rolling the ICBM into the water, from
which it can be fired). The multiple shelter system (MPS) that is
proposed for the MX ICBM is dangerous: the Soviet Union can over-
whelm the system with a large number of warheads, perhaps "crack" the
hiding scheme in which real and decoy ICBMs are randomly mixed, and
attack with SLBMs before the mobile missiles can be placed in their
protective shelters.
Third, ICBMs should be deployed on a variety of platforms and
placed randomly in isolated, non-urban areas. For example, if the
United States placed all of its new ICBMs in northern Alaska, Green-
land, or Canada, on ships around the world, and in remote mountain
valleys in the United States, a Soviet counterforce attack would not
kill millions of U.S. civilians. Thus, the ICBM should not be deploy-
ed in the middle of the United States, as was the Minuteman.
Lastly, with a force of 1,000 missiles, each having between 10
and 20 MARVed warheads, the United States could destroy any Soviet
target. Further, even 100 surviving ICBMs could attack between 1,000
and 2,000 targets. A Soviet first-strike attack, to be useful, would
have to be 100 per cent effective. This is quite unlikely to happen.
2. The SLBM can be a useful weapon if it is designed and deploy-
ed in a manner that reinforces its second-strike capabilities. First,
the Trident program should be continued, but the warheads should be
MARVed and have a yield of 200 kilotons. Second, the communication
system must be upgraded if it is to maintain secure and reliable
contact
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with submarines ut sea. Some sort of satellite systaii seems to be the
most effective. Third, the SLBM platform, the submarine, can be
smaller than the proposed Trident submarine. It can be confined to
less than global cruising ranges.
3. It is imperative that the United States develop a more effec-
tive strategic nuclear bomber. If a bomber incorporates STEALTH tech-
nology with a low altitude capability, advanced Titanium metallurgy
(which gets stronger with time), air-refuelling, vertical and/or short
takeoff and landing capabilities, full electronic countermeasures
,
satellite data links for targeting information, and nuclear hardening
for a two-man crew, it could be a very competent war-fighting nuclear
weapon.
A bomber should carry defensive missiles for the suppression of
Soviet defenses, and a mix of offensive weapons: cruise missiles,
short-range-attack missiles, five and twenty-four megaton gravity
bombs, and "smart" weapons as well. With this payload, it could at-
tack virtually any Soviet target.
Perhaps the most critical factor to bo considered in the develop-
ment of a new bomber is its basing system. First, the bomber should
be moved to a variety of bases in the heartland of the United States.
This position would give it more time in the event of a Soviet SLBM
attack. However, it would be wise to choose areas that are as remote
and removed from urban areas as possible. Second, the preferred mode
of basing would consist of underground launch facilities that are
hardened to withstand a direct nuclear blast. These shelters could
be dispersed throughout the United States and Canada; bombers would be
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moved randomly from shelter to shelter so that the Soviet Union would
not know where the bombers are, or, after a nuclear exchange, the
location of the bombers. If it did know, being in the interior of
the nation would give enough time to escape.
The United States will need about 1,000 such bombers so that it
can withstand the attrition of a protracted nuclear war. It is also
significant that this proposed bomber system uses existing technology
to build a survivable war-fighting nuclear force. This force could
be quite effective in a nuclear war, especially a protracted nuclear
one, because it could be moved from shelter to shelter after attacking
Soviet targets. If only 50 per cent of this force survived a Soviet
first-strike attack, it could still attack multiple Soviet targets for
some time. The bomber, of course, can be reloaded after successive
strikes. If the United States stockpiled sufficient reserves, with
this force it could continue attacking the Soviet Union for years
after the war started.
4. In order to improve the war-fighting capabilities of the
cruise missile, it should have an intercontinental range. Further,
with multiple warheads, electronic countenneasures , and yields from
50 kilotons to 1 megaton or more, the cruise missile would be very
threatening to the Soviet Union with respect to fighting a protracted
nuclear war. The United States could use perhaps 50,000 or more cruise
missiles on its bomber, submarine, and naval systems.
5. An effective laser ballistic-missile defense is essential if
the United States is to maintain a powerful nuclear arsenal. Such a
system, if deployed in space, could attack and destroy Soviet ICBMs,
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SLBMs, and other attacking systems. Some form of a ground-based at-
tack system could be useful as well. For example, a ground-based
laser could protect ships, bombers, and command centers. It should
cover all possible Soviet missile launch sites, and probably will re-
quire between 40 and 100 satellites. Further, the United States could,
with this force, also protect a wide variety of other military forces.
In sum, this system could protect the United States from Soviet
nuclear attack, and perhaps lead to the defeat of the Soviet Union.
It is, therefore, a revolutionary approach to nuclear war-fighting.
6. The last component of a U.S. nuclear war-fighting capability
is civil defense. First, it would be necessary to evacuate populations
from high risk to remote areas where prepositioned supplies would be
available. The existing mass transit system in the United States
could accomplish such an evacuation rapidly and effectively in a
crisis. A unified military/civil command would be necessary to
direct this activity.
Second, in those major urban areas adjacent to military installa-
tions, such as ICBM fields and bomber bases, a shelter system would
be necessary. Such shelters could be stocked with supplies of food
for 14 to 21 days.
Third, if the United States is to develop a civil defense system,
it should do so as quietly and unobtrusively as possible so as to
avoid alarming its population. The purpose, therefore, is to pro-
tect the essential industrial, military, economic, and political in-
frastructure of the United States so that recovery may begin immediate-
ly after the war is over.
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Therefore, the central orcjanizing principle in U.S. nuclear strate-
gy, with respect to this work, is the ability to fight and win a nuclear
war. As a cotnprehensive approach to nuclear war, it would allow the
United States to defeat the Soviet Union in a decisive fashion and
1 30perhaps survive. Nuclear war can no longer be considered an irra-
tional or suicidal, but purposive, instrument of U.S. national policy.
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This appendix concerns the vulnerability of hardened targets to
destruction by a nuclear explosion. A methodology, based on logarith-
mic and statistical analysis, for calculating the vulnerability of ICBM
silos is presented,
Counterforce, as well as countervalue, targets are vulnerable to
proximate nuclear explosions. Vulnerability is a function of warhead
yield and accuracy (herein referred to as "circular error probable,"
or CEP) if an "air-burst" nuclear explosion is used. In an air-burst
explosion the fireball does not come in contact with the earth. If a
"ground-burst" detonation is used, silo destruction occurs as a result
of yield, CEP, and soil conditions. The "lethality factor," that is
the degree of lethality of a silo to nuclear blast, refers to a speci-
fic combination of conditions that could lead to the destruction of
targets within a specified range. When a nuclear warhead is detonated,
it immediately produces an intense field of heat, electromagnetic radia-
tion (also called "electromagnetic pulse," or EMP) including thermal
radiation, and blast. As a fireball rapidly expands, the compression
of air in its path creates high winds, up to 400 miles per hour, and
atmospheric overpressures. The latter is measured in pounds per square
inch (psi) of overpressure.
While the EMP from the detonation disrupts all electrical communi-
cation, with respect to the destruction of an ICBM silo, the most
lethal aftereffects are the blast wave, fireball, and "cratering."
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For example, if a nuclear warhead is detonated several miles above the
silo, so that the fireball does not touch the earth, silo destruction
would be caused by the tremendous overpressures at the periphery of
the fireball. Since silos are hardened to withstand overpressures
in excess of 2,000 psi (Soviet silos may exceed 3,000 psi), the silo
would not be subject to physical dislocation. It would not be "dug
out" by the blast. This air-burst method is one way to destroy an ICBM
silo; destruction is dependent on blast, heat, and EMP. It is impor-
tant to note that these effects vary with the distance of the silo from
the explosion. There is, therefore, a critical distance between the
nuclear explosion and the silo if destruction is to occur.
The second method for destroying an ICBM silo, or any hardened
target, is to use a ground-burst nuclear explosion. In this attack, a
silo would be destroyed by the heat, EMP, and blast, but it would
also be destroyed by the formation of a crater where the silo presum-
ably stood. The specific dimensions of the crater (diameter and depth)
are a function of the yield of the warhead and the composition of the
soil. Thus, the expected size of a crater would be smaller if the
warhead were detonated over bedrock as opposed to sand.
However, the phenomenon known as "wave propagation," in which the
force of the explosion is transmitted through the ground, can also
destroy a silo. For example, if a nuclear weapon is detonated so that
the fireball touches the earth, the force of the blast propagates out-
ward; the intensity of the wave decreases with distance, in a clay-
sand soil the ground would sway substantially less than if the detona-
tion occurred over bedrock. With respect to silo destruction, it would
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occur when the wave hit the silo.
In order to calculate the expected dimensions of a crater, the
following formula is useful:
D = 38^^^^
where D is the Diameter of the crater in meters, and q is the power of
the explosion in kilotons. If a one megaton nuclear warhead is detonat-
ed at the surface, the resulting crater in a clay-sand soil would be
380 meters in diameter and between 38 and 63 meters in depth. With
this formula it is possible to determine the vulnerability of a target
to a nuclear explosion if the yield and CEP of the warhead are known.
Let us say that a one megaton warhead with a CEP of 0.15 nautical
miles (nm) is targeted against an ICBM silo. Is the silo vulnerable
to destruction? In order to calculate this, consider the diameter of
the crater, which was calculated to be 380 meters. With a CEP of 0.15
nm, which corresponds to 280 meters, wherever the warhead lands it will
destroy the silo. (Note that 280 meters is less than 380 meters; thus,
the crater caused by the warhead is larger than the area within which
the warhead is expected to land.) Even a silo hardened to withstand
3,000 psi would be destroyed by the formation of this crater. This
analysis does not include a direct measurement of the wave propagation
effect. Therefore, one method for calculating the vulnerability of a
silo is to compare the expected size of the crater caused by a nuclear
warhead with the location of the silo and the CEP of the warhead.
For ease of analysis, it is necessary to transform data about
crater diameter, and CEP in meters to a logarithmic scale. The reason
for this transformation is that comparisons of crater diameter and
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CEP are awkward without a standardized measure. For example, using a
base 10 logarithmic scale, the diameter of a crater produced by the
detonation of a one-megaton ground-burst nuclear weapon is log 2.57
(380 meters = log 2.57); an accuracy (CEP) of 0.15 nm is log 2.44
(0.15 nm X 6,080 feet/nm = 912 feet = 278 meters = log 2.44). Further,
in order to assign a standardized logarithmic scale to yield and accu-
racy indices, a composite log can be calculated. It is 1.05 (divide
log 2.57 by log 2.44), for this example. If the composite log score
is greater than 1.00, then the warhead's yield and accuracy combina-
tion would destroy a hardened ICBM silo. If it is less than 1.00, then
silo destruction is improbable.
When calculating ICBM vulnerability it is possible, and indeed
quite useful, in some cases, to target two identical warheads against
one target. The reason for this action is that, according to the
scale used in this study, a composite log score of less than 1.00 for
one warhead increases to 1.00 or greater by the detonation of two such
warheads.
For example, let us say that a 550 kiloton nuclear warhead with
an accuracy of 0.21 nm is detonated on the surface. If the resulting
crater is 311 meters (log 2.49) in diameter and the CEP of the war-
head is 389 meters (log 2.59), then the silo is not likely to be
destroyed. In this case, the composite log score is 0.96. However,
if two 550 kiloton warheads with the same accuracy of 0.21 nm are
detonated simultaneously at the surface the resulting crater would be
approximately 392 meters (log 2.59) in diameter. With this combination,
the silo would probably be destroyed; a log score of 1.00 affirms this
166
conclusion.
Given this methodology it is possible to calculate the vulnera-
bility of U.S. and Soviet ICBMs, and thus compare their ability to
destroy hardened targets in a nuclear war. (Parenthetically, it can
be said that the multiple effects of a nuclear blast could disrupt the
function and threaten the survivability of ICBMs or any hard target.
For example, EMP may erase the computer targeting data banks of the
Command Data Buffer system that controls the flight of ICBMs. Or,
after a nuclear explosion, ICBM launch may be impossible because of
atmospheric debris.) The point is that calculations of ICBM vulner-
ability based on the diameter of the expected crater and the accuracy
of the warhead is but one measure. Actual vulnerability may be even
greater than is indicated by this methodology.
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From the data in Table 1 it is important to note that the U.S. ICUM
force, in its' present configuration, could not destroy hardened Soviet
ICBM silos. For instance, unless the United States targets two Minute-
man III nuclear warheads per Soviet ICBM silo, the probability of
destruction would be too low.
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As Table 2 shows, there are 1,650 warheads on the Minuteinan III
force alone; by simple calculation it could destroy about 800 hard
targets. And this calculation may be optimistic given the uncertain-
ties surrounding actual ICBM performance. There are approximately
1,400 Soviet ICBMs that the United States would have to contend with
in a nuclear war. To attack this target group with U.S. ICBMs would
only deplete its' ICBM force without any assurance that Soviet ICBMs
would be destroyed. Thus, with its ICBM force, the United States
could destroy perhaps 57 per cent of the force; the remaining 43 per
cent, however, would contain up to 1,600 warheads.
TABLE 3
Summary of U.S. and Soviet ICBM Hard-Target Kill
Capabilities: Logarithmic Scores, Sample
Standard Deviation, Population
Standard Deviation
United States
Logarithmic Scores
Minuteman III
Minuteman II
Titan II
0.99
.94
.91
Sample Standard Deviation
Population Standard Deviation
N
= .087
=
.082
= 3
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Soviet Union
Logarithmic Scores
SS-9 1.04
SS-17
Modi 1.04
Mod2 1.08
SS-18
Modi 1.15
Mod2
.97
Mod3 1.18
Mod4 1.02
SS-19
Modi .96
Mod2 1.21
Sample Standard Deviation = .04
Population Standard Deviation = ,03
N =9
Further, from an analysis of U.S. ICBM log scores, as shown in
Table 3, it is apparent that all are below 1.00. However, if two Min-
uteman III warheads are detonated simultaneously, then the log score
is 1.03. In sum, the United States would deplete its entire ICBM
force in a counterforce strike against the Soviet Union without de-
stroying even 50 per cent of Soviet ICBMs. This condition is analo-
gous to strategic inferiority. It is also an essential parameter of
a modern nuclear war-fighting capability.
By comparison, the Soviet Union could destroy U.S. ICBM silos
with its ICBM force; it is estimated that the effectiveness of the
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Soviet aLLuck would exceed 9U per cent destruction. This conclusion
is apparent from an analysis of the log scores of Soviet ICBMs in Table
I. For exuiiiple, as Table 1 shows, of the nine ICliM models currently de-
ployed by the Soviet Union, seven could destroy hardened targets. The
log scores for all of these missiles are greater than 1.00. For the
remaining two ICBMs, (the SS-18 mod 1 and the SS-19 mod I), their hard-
target kill capability is assured if two warheads per silo are used.
However, the United States can also use two warheads per Soviet ICBM
silo, but it is the larger yield of Soviet warheads that increases
the probability of destruction. As Table 2 shows, the Soviet Union
has a total of 688 hard-target capable ICBMs with 3,600 warheads.
The United States, however, has 550 ICBMs and 1,650 warheads. Since
the 1,650 U.S. warheads are capable of silo destruction by themselves,
two warheads would have to be targeted against each Soviet silo.
Therefore, on the basis of this analysis the U.S. ICBM force is in-
ferior, with respect to silo destruction, in comparison with Soviet
ICBMs. The explanation for such inferiority is that U.S. ICBMs are
capable of attacking only countervalue targets. Soviet ICBMs on the
other[iand, are quite capable of destroying counterforce as well as
countervalue targets. On the basis of this difference, one parameter
of strategic Inferiority is deduced.
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From labic 4 it may be concluded that the U.S. SLBM force could
not destroy hard targets, such as ICBM silos. The only exception to
this is the Trident 1; however, in order to destroy an ICBM silo it
would be necessary to target four Trident warheads per silo. Even
if the United States targeted all ten warheads on the Poseidon SLBM,
with its yield of 40 kilotons and CEP of 0.25 nm, against one Soviet
ICBM silo, silo destruction would be highly unlikely. With log scores
well below 1.00 it is apparent that SLBMs are most suitable for attack-
ing countervalue targets, such as cities and industries.
Despite the substantially larger yield of Soviet SLBM warheads,
these conclusions apply with equal force to Soviet SLBMs. The crucial
distinction between these two forces is that the larger yield Soviet
warheads would cause greater damage against a particular target than
any U.S. SLBM. This logic applies even if the United States were to
detonate all ten warheads on the Poseidon over one city.
What can be concluded from this analysis? First, that the United
States cannot engage in counterforce nuclear exchange with the Soviet
Union without severely depleting its nuclear forces. Further, even
such depletion would not ensure the destruction of Soviet nuclear
forces. It would, however, push the United States farther into stra-
tegic inferiority after each successive nuclear strike. Second, that
the Soviet Union is prepared, with respect to its nuclear capabilities,
to engage in a brief, yet intense, as well as protracted, nuclear war.
Not only could the Soviet Union destroy U.S. nuclear forces with less
than 50 per cent of its' ICBM force, but it could retain superior
nuclear forces for attacking U.S. countervalue targets. In sum, the
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Soviet Union today could defeat the United States in a central strate-
gic nuclear war. There are indications that while Soviet war-fighting
capabilities continue to expand each year, U.S. war-fighting capabili-
ties are falling farther behind.
Third, the purpose is to suggest a methodology for measuring ICBM
vulnerability. The most essential aspects of silo destruction are the
yield and CEP of the attacking warhead. It is the difference between
U.S. and Soviet warhead yields, the yield of U.S. warheads being small-
er, that accounts for Soviet nuclear superiority. The larger number
of Soviet warheads, that is hard-target capable warheads, that is also
a factor. Given that this methodology does not directly consider wave
propagation, the Soviet war-fighting capability may be even more over-
whelming .


